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King: California Law Survey

SURVEY: WOMEN AND
CALIFORNIA LAW
This survey of California Law, a regular feature of the
Women's Law Forum,· summarizes recent California Supreme
Court and Court of Appeal decisions of special importance to
women. A brief analysis of the issues pertinent to women raised
in each case is provided.
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CRIMINAL LAW

A.

CHILD STEALING

799

1. Parent with any right to custody not guilty of child
stealing

Cline v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 943, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 787 (1st Dist. 1982). The court of appeal in Cline v. Superior Court issued a peremptory writ of prohibition to prevent
prosecution of a father for child stealing and kidnapping where,
having the only arguably valid custody order, he forcibly removed his child from the child's mother.} However, it allowed
prosecution of a child abuse charge against the father where
there was reasonable cause to believe that the manner in which
he removed his child placed the child in circumstances likely to
produce great bodily harm or death.

A mother moved from Indiana to California with her twoyear-old son. Although she neither had been served with nor
knew of any custody order or proceedings, defendant father had
obtained an ex parte order in Indiana granting him temporary
custody of their son. Without trying to enforce the order legally,
he arrived at the house where the mother and son were staying
1. See also People v. Howard, 139 Cal. App. 3d 1020, 189 Cal. Rptr. 120 (4th Dist.
1983) (Child stealing conviction reversed where, although wife had valid custody order,
couple had attempted a reconciliation).
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and asked to see his son. When the mother brought their son to
the door, the father grabbed him and ran, carrying him like a
football and throwing him in the back seat of a car. When the
mother caught up and struggled to prevent the car from leaving,
the father pulled her into the car and the struggle continued,
with the mother trying to grab the steering wheel and "jam" the
transmission.
The father was charged with three violations of the Penal
Code: child stealing under section 278;2 kidnapping under section 207;3 and child abuse under section 273a(1).4 The trial court
denied his motion to dismiss and he appealed.
Penal Code section 278 makes it a crime for a person without a right to custody of a child to take, entice away, detain or
conceal the child from his or her parent or a person with lawful
custody. II But under Civil Code section 197,6 the mother and father of an unmarried minor have equal right to the minor's custody, services, and earnings. Therefore, the California Supreme
Court has held that in the absence of a custody order, a parent
does not commit child stealing by taking exclusive possession of
the child.'
The court of appeal in Cline applied this reasoning to hold
that where the father had the only arguably valid custody order;
he did not commit "child stealing" by taking his son from the
mother. Although the court found the father's actions to be reprehensible, it would not "fill gaps left by the legislature,,8 and
therefore issued the writ.
To "kidnap" someone who is too young to give or withhold
consent, one must do so for an illegal purpose or with an illegal
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (Deering 1983).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 207 (Deering 1983).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(l) (Deering 1983).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (Deering 1983). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5 (Deering 1983).
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 197 (Deering 1983).
7. Wilborn v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 828, 830, 337 P.2d 65, 66 (1959).
8. The legislature had considered, but rejected, a bill which would have added Penal
Code § 279, making it a crime in the absence of a custody order for a person having a
right to custody to detain or conceal a child from another with a custody or visitation
right. AB 2549, Cal. Leg., 1975-76 Reg. Sess.

Women's Law Forum

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss3/8

4

King: California Law Survey

1983]

CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY

735

intent. 9 Because the father was at least equally as entitled to
custody as the mother, the court found that his intent and purpose were legal. 10 Therefore, they issued a writ as to the kidnapping charge as well.
Penal Code section 273a(1) makes it a felony, under circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm or death, to willfully
cause unjustifiable physical or mental pain to a child or to "willfully cause or permit such child to be placed in such a situation
that its person or health is endangered . . . . "11 Actual great
bodily harm or death is not required. 12 The court in People v.
Peabody 13 held that proof of criminal negligence was required to
find that a parent had abused a child under section 273a.
The Cline court found that there was "some rational ground
for assuming the possibility"14 that the father had, with the requisite degree of negligence, endangered the person or health of
his child. The court found that, although the mother's attempt
to grab the steering wheel contributed to the danger, the father
should have foreseen that her natural instinct would be to rescue
her child. The court therefore refused to issue a writ as to the
child abuse charge.
The court in Cline held that until the legislature prohibits
it, a parent with a right to the custody of a child may forcibly
take such child from his or her other parent. This would seem to
apply even where the parents' custody rights are co-equal. However, as some measure of protection for the child, the court
would charge the taking parent with child abuse if the manner
in which the child is taken endangers its person or health.
9. People v. Oliver, 55 Cal. 2d 761, 768, 361 P.2d 593, 597, 12 Cal. Rptr. 865, 869
(1961).
10. See also Howard, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 1024, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 122 (trial court
erred in denying jury instructions on mistake of law and reconciliation where defendant
father arguably believed attempted reconciliation had invalidated previous custody
award).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(1) (Deering 1983).
12. People v. Jaramillo, 98 Cal. App. 3d 830, 835, 159 Cal. Rptr. 771, 774 (1979).
13. 46 Cal. App. 3d 43, 119 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1975).
14. Ghent v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 3d 944, 955, 153 Cal. Rptr. 720, 727
(1979).
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II. FAMILY LAW
A.

COMMUNITY PROPERTY

Community property interest in spouse's recovery as
"immediate benefit"
1.

Duggan v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 267, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 410 (1st Dist. 1981); Hand v. Superior Court, 134 Cal.
App. 3d 436, 184 Cal. Rptr. 588 (3d Dist. 1982). Two courts of
appeal grappled with the question of whether or not a spouse
not named as a party to an action by or against his or her spouse
is a person for whose immediate benefit the action is brought,
solely because of the non-party spouse's potential community
property interest in the recovery. In Duggan v. Superior Court,
the court held that a non-party spouse could refuse to be deposed under the privileges defined in Evidence Code sections
970 and 971 in an action for dissolution and accounting of partnership, although she had a potential community property interest in her husband's recovery. In Hand v. Superior Court, the
court held that plaintiff husband's attorney could not refuse to
produce plaintiff's wife for deposition under Code of Civil Procedure section 2019(a)( 4) in a personal injury action in which any
recovery would be community property. Although the procedural contexts were slightly different, both courts used the same
"immediate benefit" test and quoted the same cases in coming
to these diametrically opposed· conclusions.

In Duggan, an action for dissolution and accounting of partnership, defendant sought to depose plaintiff's wife and she asserted her privilege not to testify against plaintiff under Evidence Code section 9701& and 971. 16 The trial court issued an
order to compel the deposition and plaintiff husband appealed.
In Hand, a personal injury action, defendant notified plaintiff
husband's attorney that he intended to depose plaintiff's wife.
Plaintiff's attorney refused to produce the wife, claiming for her
the same privilege.17 The trial court applied the spousal privilege
15. CAL. EVID. CODE § 970 (Deering 1966).
16. CAL. EVID. CODE § 971 (Deering 1966).
17. The court, however, chose to analyze the privilege under Code of Civil Procedure
§ 2019(a)(4), CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019(a)(4) (Deering 1983), since the privileges in
Evidence Code §§ 970 and 971 could not be asserted by plaintiff or his attorney for the
wife.
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and refused to issue an order compelling the deposition. Defendant appealed.
Evidence Code sections 970 and 971 grant spouses the privileges not to testify against and not to be called as witness
against their respective spouse. Section 973(b)I8 provides an exception to these privileges when the spouse asserting them is a
person for whose immediate benefit the action is being prosecuted or defended. Code of Civil Procedure section 2019(a)(4)I9
allows a person for whose immediate benefit an action is prosecuted or defended to be noticed for deposition by service on the
attorney of the party so prosecuting or defending.
In Freeman v. Jergins,20 plaintiff sought to recover money
promised to him in an oral contract to find a buyer for defendant's stock. The court held that a witness who had allegedly
agreed with plaintiff to help him find the buyer for a share of
plaintiff's profit, could not be examined under then Code of
Civil Procedure section 2055 21 as one for whose immediate benefit the action was being prosecuted. 22 Despite his possible entitlement to a share in any recovery, the court held that because
his claim was against plaintiff rather than directly against defendants, he was not such a person.
In Waters v. Superior Court,2S the California Supreme
Court held that "a person for whose immediate benefit an action
. . . is prosecuted or defended . . ." under Code of Civil Procedure section 2019(a)( 4) was a person who had an "immediate
right to the amount recovered or some portion of it as soon as it
was recovered by the nominal plaintiff."24 Although the person
sought to be deposed was the sole shareholder of defendant corporation, the court held that he was not such a person. In
18. CAL. EVID. CODE § 973(b) (Deering 1966).
19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019(a)(4) (Deering 1983).
20. 125 Cal. App. 2d 536, 271 P.2d 210 (1954).
21. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2055 (Deering 1973) repealed by Cobey-Song Evidence
Act, ch. 299, § 126, 1965 Cal. Stat. 1297. For substance, see CAL. EVID. CODE § 776 (Deering 1983) (allowing a party to call and examine as if by cross-examination a witness who
is identified with an adverse party).
22. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 776(d)(1) (Deering 1983) (defining a person identified
with an adverse party as one who will be immediately benefited by a recovery by such
party).
23. 58 Cal. 2d 885, 377 P.2d 265, 27 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1962).
24. Id. at 897, 377 P.2d at 271, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
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Southern California Edison CO. v, Superior Court,26 the court
held that because of their rights to an "immediate share in the
recovery," unnamed plaintiffs in a class action were persons for
whose benefit the action was being prosecuted under section
2019(a)(4).28

The court in Hand noted that the test for an "immediately
benefited person" is the same under Code of Civil Procedure
section 2019(a)(4) as it is under Evidence Code 973(b).27 Citing
the above cases, it held that as long as the recovery is community property,28 the wife's share in it is immediate enough to satisfy the test. The court accordingly reversed the trial court's refusal to compel the deposition. Citing the same language in the
above cases, the Duggan court held that any potential community property claim wife might have in husband's specific partnership property would be a claim against her husband rather
than against defendants. Without a direct claim against defendants, she could not be a person for whose benefit her husband
was prosecuting the action, although she was one who might
benefit from it. 29 It reversed the trial court's order to compel.
Since the two courts relied on the same cases, their differing
analyses seem to be based on different views as to the nature of
a community property interest. Certainly, Hand is inconsistent
with Freeman to the extent that the case requires that wife have
a claim against defendants. She is not simply an unnamed or
absent party as were the unnamed plaintiffs in Southern California Edison. The Hand court nevertheless views her community property interest as one to which she has immediate access
as soon as it is recovered, and finds that to be enough. The Duggan court, on the other hand, views a wife's interest as arising
from a legal relationship with her husband by which she must
25. 7 Cal. 3d 832, 500 P.2d 621, 103 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1972).
26. However, the court allowed a protective order under section 2019(b)(I). Id. at
843, 500 P.2d at 628, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
27. Because there are no cases interpreting the phrase in section 973(b), the Duggan
court also used the section 2019(a)(4) cases.
28. The court found that under California law a personal injury recovery is community property, although its value will be assigned to the injured spouse upon dissolution.
29. Although the court also noted that under Corporations Code § 15025(2)(3) specific partnership property is not community property, it is clear that the court did not
rely on this fact in reaching its conclusion that a potential community property interest
is not a direct enough benefit.
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claim her right to a share. The court reads the cases as strictly
requiring a wife to have her own legal claim against defendants
in order to satisfy the test.
2. Distribution of postponed retirement benefits upon
dissolution
In re Marriage of Shattuck, 134 Cal. App. 3d 683, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 698 (1st Dist. 1982) addressed the question of whether or
not non-employee spouses can demand distribution of their
share of employee spouses' retirement benefits upon dissolution,
although such employee spouses have chosen to postpone retirement. The appellate court followed the rule established in In re
Marriage of Brown 30 and In re Marriage of Gillmore S1 that a
distribution of pension benefits can be demanded upon dissolution, but held that it could not be accomplished through
monthly payments equal to what non-employee spouses' share of
the benefits would be had employee spouses chosen to retire. Because employee spouses would not begin to receive benefits until
they retire, such a distribution system would frustrate the equal
division requirement of Civil Code section 4800. S2

Husband and wife were employees of a company and beneficiaries of its pension plan. At the time of trial for dissolution,
husband's pension rights had vestedS3 and matured,s. while
wife's had only vested. Both had decided to continue working
beyond the time when they might retire and until retirement
was required by the company. At trial, wife requested distribution of her share of husband's pension benefits on a monthly basis, as if he had retired and were receiving them. Instead, the
trial court denied distribution and reserved jurisdiction to distribute the pension upon husband's retirement. Wife appealed.
In In re Marriage of Brown, the California Supreme Court
30. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
31. 29 Cal. 3d 418, 629 P.2d I, 174 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1981).
32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (Deering 1983).
33. Pension right is not subject to forfeiture if employment is terminated before
retirement. Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 842, 544 P.2d at 563, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
34. Employee has achieved an unconditional right to immediate payment. Brown, 15
Cal. 3d at 842, 544 P.2d at 563, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 635. According to this definition, the
Shattuck court's use of the word "matured" to describe husband's pension was not completely accurate since he had not yet chosen to retire. He had, however, reached the age
of permissive retirement.
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first recognized non-vested and immature pension rights to be a
"contingent interest in property" rather than merely an "expectancy," so that such property rights might be distributed as
community property upon dissolution. In In re Marriage of Gillmore, the court found that an ex-husband whose retirement
rights had both vested and matured, must, upon request by his
ex-wife, pay to her her share of his retirement benefits, although
he had chosen to delay his retirement. The court held that husband could not, by exercising a choice completely within his control, defeat or control the timing of wife's receipt of her own
property (her interest in the community pension). The husband
retained the right to choose when to retire, but if that choice
affected wife's property rights, he would be required to compensate her. The court left the mode of such compensation to the
discretion of the trial court. One mode suggested was payment
of a share of the benefits on a monthly basis.
The Shattuck court followed Gillmore by compelling immediate distribution of wife's interest in husband's pension. But in
addition, it held that the mode of distribution requested by wife
would result in unequal distribution by requiring husband to
make monthly payments from a "fictional" pension. It held that
the present value of wife's interest must be actuarially determined, taking into consideration the uncertainties involved. The
court left the mode of distribution to the discretion of the trial
court. Presumedly, monthly payments would be acceptable, if
they reflected the actuarial present value of the wife's interest. 3Ci
If the purpose of the decision in Gillmore was to compensate the non-employee spouse for lost property rights as a result
of the employee spouse's choosing to delay retirement, Shattuck
would seem to be somewhat inconsistent with that case. The
Shattuck court, by valuing wife's interest in the pension with
regard to the uncertainties inherent in the decision to delay retirement, has shifted some of the risks of that decision back to
the wife.

3.

Community property personal injury damages and

35. Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 894, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255, 256 (1972)
(disapproved on other grounds in Brown); Gillmore, 29 Cal. 3d 418, 629 P.2d 1, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 493 (1981).
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property purchased therewith to be treated upon dissolution as
separate property of injured spouse
In re Marriage of Devlin, 138 Cal. App. 3d 804, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (3d Dist. 1982); In re Marriage of Morris, 139 Cal. App.
3d 823, 189 Cal. Rptr. 80 (4th Dist. 1983). Two recent cases interpreted Civil Code section 4800(c)'s requirement that personal
injury funds of one spouse acquired during the marriage, though
community property, be assigned to the injured spouse upon dissolution. In In re Marriage of Devlin, the court of appeal held
that upon dissolution, community property acquired with funds
from a personal injury recovery of one spouse is to be treated
the same as such funds would be if they had remained unspent.
Although the married couple had bought a family home with the
husband's personal injury funds, and had taken title in joint
tenancy, the court held that section 4800(c) required that the
home be assigned to the husband upon dissolution. In In re
Marriage of Morris, the court of appeal held that an assignment
of personal injury funds to the injured spouse need not be offset
by an award of other community property to the uninjured
spouse. In other words, section 4800(c) is an exception to the
equal division requirement.

In Devlin, all of husband's personal injury damages award
were spent on a piece of property and specially equipped mobile
home, which the couple took in joint tenancy. The couple had no
other major community property. Upon dissolution, the trial
court awarded all but some miscellaneous personal property to
husband, and wife appealed. In Morris, the trial court awarded
the part of the couple's community property consisting of wife's
personal injuries settlement to wife in its entirety upon dissolution. The court divided the rest of the community property
evenly between wife and husband, without offsetting the funds
from wife's personal injury recovery. Husband appealed.
Civil Code section 4800(a)S6 requires an equal division of all
community property upon dissolution. Section 4800(C)37 reads in
part: "Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a), community property personal injury damages shall be assigned to
the party who suffered the injuries unless the court . . . deter36. CAL. CIY. CODE § 4800(a) (Deering 1983).
37. CAL. CIY. CODE § 4800(c) (Deering 1983).
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mines that the interests of justice require another disposition."
The section goes on to define community property personal injury damages as "all money or other property received or to be
received . . . in satisfaction of a judgment for damages for . . .
personal injuries or pursuant to [a] ... settlement ... of a
claim for such damages . . . ."
Section 4800(c) is ambiguous in two ways: (1) It makes no
provision for property bought with "money received as personal
injury damages"; and (2) it fails to address the division of remaining community property after personal injury damages are
assigned. Therefore, it leaves open the question of whether or
not such damages must be offset by awarding a larger portion of
the other community property to the uninjured spouse.
As to the first ambiguity, there is no case directly on point.
Under Civil Code section 5110,38 a family residence acquired
during marriage and taken in joint tenancy is presumed to be
community property for purposes of division upon dissolution,
even when such a residence is purchased with the separate funds
of one spouse. 39 Yet, in proposing the enactment of section
4800(c)'s predecessor,4o the California Law Revision Commission
commented that the section would apply even though money recovered for personal injury damages had been invested in securities or other property.41 In In re Marriage of Mason,42 the court
denied a wife's claim to one-half of her husband's personal injury damages, although they had been placed in a joint trust
fund.
The court in Devlin distinguished a gift of separate property to the community, such as is presumed by section 5110,
from a similar use of community property funds received in personal injury damages. Since such community funds are not subject to separate control, the court concluded that it was not logi38. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5100 (Deering 1983).
39. In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 815, 614 P.2d 285, 288, 166 Cal. Rptr.
853, 856 (1980); Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967).
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 146(c) repealed by Act of September 4, 1969, ch. 1608, § 3,
1969 Cal. Stat. 3313.
41. 8 Cal. Law Revision Comm. Rep. 1397 (1967).
42. 93 Cal. App. 3d 215, 155 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979).
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cal to infer a "gift" to the community. It therefore followed the
Law Revision Commission interpretation that the purchase of
property with community property personal injury funds does
not convert such funds to "regular" (section 4800(a» community
property. Instead, section 4800(c) applies to such purchased
property in the same manner as it would apply to the liquidated
funds used to purchase it.43
The predecessor to section 4800(c) was enacted at the same
time as personal injury damages were converted from separate
to community property. For this reason, one commentator has
concluded as to the second ambiguity of section 4800(c), that the
section was "designed to assure that personal injury damages are
treated like separate property upon dissolution."44 In Mason,
the court accepted the above interpretation without discussion
and awarded $400,000 in community property personal injury
damages to the injured husband without offset. Similarly, although it did not discuss the ambiguity in section 4800(c), the
Devlin court did not offset husband's award. 411
In Morris, the court concluded that the community property remaining after assignment of personal injury damages was
to be divided evenly for three reasons. First, the "notwithstanding" language of section 4800(c) indicates it is an exception to
the equal division requirement of section 4800(a). Second, the
legislative history above indicates that personal injury damages
should be treated as separate property upon dissolution, leaving
the rest of the community property to be divided evenly. Third,
because section 4800(b)(1)46 allows a court to award an asset to
one spouse and offset it with an award to the other, section
4800(c) would be rendered unnecessary by an interpretation
which required courts to offset personal injury damages. As the
court pointed out, such funds are often specifically earmarked
for special equipment, artificial limbs, etc., for the benefit of the
injured spouse. Therefore, the court concluded that section
43. Thus, the only circumstance under which personal injury damages would convert to regular community property is when it is commingled with other community
property beyond recognition.
44. 2 MARKEY, CAL. FAMILY LAW § 24.11 (2) at 24-17 (1978).
45. It should be noted, however, that the couple in Devlin had virtually no other
community property with which the court could offset the award.
46. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(b)(l) (Deering 1983).
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4800(c) is an exception to the rule requiring equal division of all
community property.
The courts in Devlin and Morris have addressed the ambiguities in Civil Code section 4800(c)'s requirement that community property personal injury damages be assigned to the injured
spouse upon dissolution. Both courts resolved such ambiguities
in favor of the injured spouse by holding that property purchased with such funds must be assigned in the same manner as
such funds themselves are, and that no offset of other community property to the uninjured spouse is required.
4. Application of Uniformed Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act to community property division of military
penswn
In re Marriage of Biukema, 139 Cal. App. 3d 689, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 856 (4th Dist. 1983). In In re Marriage of Biukema, the
court of appeal upheld an equal division of a husband's military
retirement pension under the Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act. The Act overruled the United States
Supreme Court decision in McCarty v. McCarty;n which held
that community property division of military pensions was prohibited under the federal military pension scheme which
preempts state law.

The final judgment of dissolution of the Biukema's marriage
was enacted three months before the Supreme Court decided
McCarty. The superior court had divided husband's military
pension as community property. When McCarty was decided,
husband appealed and requested a retroactive application of
McCarty.
California Civil Code section 4800(a)48 requires that all community property and quasi-community property be equally divided upon dissolution. The California Supreme Court had held
that military retirement benefits which had vested at the time of
dissolution were community property under California law. 49
47. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
48. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(a) (Deering 1983).
49. In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974)
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974).
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However, in McCarty, the United States Supreme Court overruled the California law by holding that California policy of dividing military pensions: (1) conflicted with the federal scheme
of military retirement benefits; and (2) was injurious to the
objectives of that federal scheme. Therefore, the Court held that
the California community property law was preempted by the
federal scheme. Since that decision, several California courts
have denied retroactive application of McCarty where the trial
court did not retain jurisdiction over the pension issue. llo
Effective February 1, 1983, Congress passed the Uniformed
Services Former Spouses' Protection Act,1I1 which reads in part:
(c)(1) Subject to the limitations of this section[u],
a court may treat disposable retired or retainer
pay payable to a member [of the Military] for pay
periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as
property solely of the member or as property of
the member and his spouse in accordance with
the law of the jurisdiction of such court.

The court in Buikema applied the above section to deny
husband's claim for retroactive application of McCarty. The
court correctly declared that "California law treating military retirement pensions as community property is no longer
preempted."
Congress has finally clarified its intent as to the distribution
of military retirement pensions upon dissolution. As the court
held in Buikema, California community property law now stands
without federal preemption, and military retirement· pensions
will be divided as community property in California dissolution
proceedings.
50. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sheldon, 124 Cal. App. 3d 371, 177 Cal. Rptr. 380
(4th Dist. 1981) modified, 125 Cal. App. 3d 415f (1981) (retroactive application denied);
In re Marriage of Mahone, 123 Cal. App. 3d 17, 176 Cal. Rptr. 274 (2d Dist. 1981) (retroactive application to dissolution stipulation denied).
51. Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1002(a), 96 Stat. 730 (1982) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §
1048).
52. Limitations include: termination upon death of member or former spouse, 10
U.S.C. 1048(d)(4); maximum to one former spouse not to exceed 50 percent of total retirement pay; 10 U.S.C. 1048(e)(I); maximum under all court orders and processes under
this Act and the Social Security Act not to exceed 65 percent of total retirement pay, 10
U.S.C. 1048(e)(4)(B).
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5. Spousal support owed to previous spouse is "debt
chargeable" against community property of deceased husband's
second marriage

In In re Marriage of D'Antoni, 125 Cal. App. 3d 747, 178
Cal. Rptr. 285 (1st Dist. 1981), the court of appeal held that
spousal support owed to a previous wife is a "debt chargeable"
against the community property of her deceased ex-husband's
second marriage. 63 It reversed the trial court's holding that Probate Code section 205 excluded unpaid spousal support as such
a debt. Thus, a deceased husband's second wife may be held
personally liable for unpaid support payments. Her liability is
limited, however, to the value of her own interest in the community property immediately prior to his death and any of his interest in community property that passes to her without
administration.
Plaintiff's first wife sued her ex-husband's second wife to recover child and spousal support left unpaid by the deceased husband. Reading section 205 to limit the types of debts for which a
surviving spouse may be held liable, the trial court denied plaintiff a writ of execution on the unpaid support.64 Plaintiff
appealed.
Until 1975, the section which governed liability of a surviving spouse for the debts of his or her deceased spouse was former section 202 of the Probate Code. 66 In 1975, section 205 replaced section 202.66 It reads in part, "the surviving spouse is
personally liable for the debts of the deceased spouse chargeable
against the community property . .. by the provisions of [Civil
Code sections 5100-5138] . . . . "67
53. Defendant had filed for and received determinations that certain property was
community property and passed to her without administration. It is this property out of
which plaintiff sought to recover her unpaid support through a writ of execution.
54. The court limited the debts to those arising out of torts and contracts and for
those owed general expenses.
55. This section made community property liable for all the debts of a deceased
husband. CAL. PROD. CODE § 202 (enacted 1931) (repealed 1975).
56. 1974 Cal. Stat. 18 (Codified as amended at CAL. PROD. CODE § 205 (Deering
1983».
57. CAL. PROD. CODE § 205(a) (Deering 1983) (emphasis added). Section 205(a) also
limits such liability to the amount the surviving spouse is entitled to from the community property without administration.
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Civil Code sections 5100 et seq. govern the respective property interests of married people. Sections 5116, 5121 and 5122
are particularly applicable to the reference in Probate Code section 205 because they regulate the liabilities of community and
separate properties for the individual debts of a spouse. These
sections, which provide that certain individual debts are chargeable to community property, do not include child support. 1I8
However, certain cases have clearly held community property
partially liable for the husband's unpaid support obligations. 1I9
The decision in Weinberg v. Weinberg 60 relies heavily on
the husband's statutory control over community property funds
in establishing both his right to make support payments out of
such funds and the liability of such funds for unpaid support. 61
However, In re Marriage of Barnes and In re Marriage of
Smaltz were decided after the enactment of Probate Code section 205 and the amendment of Civil Code section 5125, and
both uphold the rule that community property may be charged
with spousal support.62
The court of appeal in D'Antoni disagreed with the trial
court's reading of Probate Code section 205. The court upheld
58. Section 5116 makes community property liable for the contracts of either spouse
entered into during marriage. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5116 (Deering 1983). Section 5121 makes
the separate property of either spouse liable for debts incurred by the other in acquiring
"necessaries of life." CAL. CIV. CODE § 5121 (Deering 1983). Section 5122 regulates liabili- .
ties for debts arising out of the torts of a spouse, satisfaction of which is allowed from
both separate and community property. If the injury occurred while the injuring spouse
was acting to benefit the community, the debt is satisfied first from community property
and second from the separate property of the injuring spouse. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5122(a)(b) (Deering 1983).
59. Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); In re Marriage of
Barnes, 83 Cal. App. 3d 143, 147 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1978); In re Marriage of Smaltz, 82 Cal.
App. 3d 568, 147 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1978).
60. Written before the enactment of Probate Code section 205.
61. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d at 563, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 15. Such statutory control no
longer exists. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (Deering 1983) amended in 1973 to vest control in
"either spouse" rather than in "the husband.")
62. In Barnes, "[tjhe parties apparently agree[dj that [the husband's) court-ordered obligation to [his first wife) for spousal support is a 'debt' which is 'chargeable
against the community property of his marriage to [his second wife) within the meaning
of Probate Code section 205 . . . . " 83 Cal. App. 3d at 149, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 714 (emphasis added). Smaltz (claim of living husband's second wife for reimbursement of community funds spent by husband for spousal support) held that community property is liable
for all of the husband's debts, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 570, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 155, and that
reimbursement is not required when support payments are based on community funds
alone. [d. at 572, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
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Weinberg, Barnes, and Smaltz against the apparently limiting
reference in section 205(a). Its decision did not clearly address
the issue of whether support payments are a "debt chargeable"
at all. Instead, it ignored the reference to the Civil Code,63 relied
on the above cases,64 interpreted section 205(c) to negate the reference in section 205(a),611 and made vague reference to legislative intent,88 public policy,87 and justice. 8s
The trial court in D'Antoni gave a reasonable meaning to
Probate Code section 205(a) and to its reference to Civil Code
sections 5100 et seq .. Nevertheless, the court of appeal followed
questionable case law without adequately justifying its rejection
of the trial court's interpretation. The court neither specifically
addressed the reference upon which the trial court apparently
based its decision nor cited cases that address such reference.
Although D'Antoni left unclear the meaning of section 205(a)'s
reference to the Civil Code, it did clearly hold that a deceased
husband's second wife may continue to be held personally liable
to his first wife for support payments he neglected to make.
63. The court deleted the reference when quoting section 205(a).
64. The cases are of little precedential value in interpreting section 205(a). Weinberg was written before the section was enacted. In Barnes, the parties agreed that
spousal support was a "debt chargeable," so that particular issue was never reached by
the court. See supra, note 62. Smaltz did not involve a fact situation similar to that in
D'Antoni and its only holding was that when support payments were based only on community funds, and there was no separate property available to the husband, no reimbursement to the community was required. Smaltz involved no probate question, so section 205 was not at issue. See supra, note 62.
65. Probate code section 205(c) allows that "any debt described in subdivision (a)
may be enforced against the surviving spouse in the same manner as it could have been
enforced against the deceased spouse if the deceased spouse had not died." CAL. PROB.
CODE § 205(c) (Deering 1983) (emphasis added). The court read this section to mean that
support payments were chargeable against the defendant in the same way they would
have been chargeable against her husband. A more reasonable reading of section 205(c)
is that it would allow first wife to enforce against second wife those debts found to be
chargeable, by writ of execution rather than by separate action.
66. The court presumed that the legislature had not intended to change the long
established rule that support payments are chargeable against community property.
67. The court saw no public policy supporting the limitation of "debts chargeable"
to those arising out of torts and contracts.
68. The court's decision that it was in the "interests of justice" to reverse the trial
court's interpretation of section 205 did not seem to be based on the relative financial
status of the two women or on the husband's having no separate property from which to
pay the debt. It is unclear whether considerations peculiar to this case motivated the
court's decision, or whether the court would always find justice to be better served by
charging a surviving spouse with his or her deceased spouse's unpaid spousal support.
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Such liability will be limited, however, to the value of that portion of the community property to which the second wife is entitled without administration.
B.

CHILD CUSTODY AND CONTROL

1. Schizophrenia not per se detrimental to children for
custody purposes

In re Jaime M., 134 Cal. App. 3d 530, 184 Cal. Rptr. 778 (3d
Dist. 1982). The court of appeal in In re Jaime M. held that a
mother's schizophrenia is not per se detrimental to her children
for purposes of removing them from her custody under Civil
Code section 4600(c). Although it upheld the trial court's finding
that two children were within Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300(a)'s definition of "dependent children," the court of
appeal reversed the trial court's dispositional order removing
them from their schizophrenic mother. It held that for such a
disposition to stand, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the mother's illness was in fact detrimental to the
children and that termination of her parental rights was essential to avert harm to the children. It also instructed the trial
court to include a reunification plan in its dispositional decision
on remand.

A mother of two children had a chronic schizophrenic illness
which manifested itself in paranoid delusions which were, however, controlled by the use of drugs. She had been hospitalized
three times for her illness, twice voluntarily. The children were
healthy and she had not mistreated them physically. However,
once, when she failed to maintain her drug therapy, she took her
children to a police station and asked that they be placed in protective custody.
Proceedings were commenced to determine whether the
children should be removed from her custody. The trial court
found that they were "dependent children" under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300(a).69 It also found that an award of
custody to the mother would be detrimental to the children, but
failed to state on what evidence it relied in reaching its decision.
The mother appealed, alleging that the evidence was insufficient
69. CAL. WEU'. & INST. CODE § 300 (8) (Deering 1983).
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to support the juvenile court's dependency finding and termination of custody, and that it failed to establish a reunification
plan as required by California Rule of Court number 1376. 70
A dependency proceeding consists of two distinct hearings,
one under Civil Code section 30071 to establish the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court, and another if jurisdiction is established,
under section 356,72 to determine the disposition of the dependent child's custody. For the court to assert jurisdiction and declare a child to be a dependent of the court the child must be
found by a preponderance of the evidence to be a person described by section 300. 78 On review, the appellate court must
read all reasonable inferences in favor of the juvenile court's
findings and view the record in the light most favorable to its
orders.74
However, once dependency is found, the juvenile court is
not required to remove the child from its parents, but has several options. 711 In fact, because of the strong policy favoring parental custody over non-parental custody, the California Supreme Court has held that Civil Code "section 460076 permits
the juvenile court to award custody to a nonparent against the
claim of a parent only upon a clear showing that such award is
essential to avert harm to the child."77 Thus, subsequent cases
have required clear and convincing evidence that particular detriment to the child would result from awarding parental custody
before such custody fights are terminated. 78
70. Cal. R. Ct. 1376 (Deering 1980).
71. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (Deering 1983).
72. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 356 (Deering 1983).
73. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355 (Deering 1979).
74. In re Luwanna S., 31 Cal. App. 3d 112, 114, 107 Cal. Rptr. 62, 63 (1973).
75. In re Jeannette S., 94 Cal. App. 3d 52,60-61, 156 Cal. Rptr. 262, 267-68 (1979).
76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c) (Deering 1983) (requiring. before custody is awarded to
a non-parent without the parent's consent, a finding that parental custody award would
be detrimental to child and award to non-parent is required to serve best interests of
child).
77. In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 698-99, 523 P.2d 244, 257-58, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 45758 (1974). The court thus rejected the "best interests of the child" test when removal
from parental custody is at stake.
78. In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978); In re Jeremy C., 109 Cal. App. 3d 384, 167 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1980).
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In In re Jeannette S.,'19 the clear and convincing standard
was not met. Although detriment was shown, options short of
terminating parental custody existed which might have minimized such detriment. In In re A.J., the court held that a
mother's adulterous relationship with her live in boyfriend was
not "ipso facto depravity in the home"80 sufficient to justify termination of custody, but that parental custody under such circumstances must be weighed against all other possibly detrimental alternatives rather than against dominant social standards. 81
Under the above standards, the court in Jaime M. upheld
the trial court's assertion of jurisdiction, but reversed and remanded for further dispositional proceedings. It found that the
mother's actions in bringing her children to the police station
and the fact of her mental illness were sufficient to establish, by
a preponderance, that her children should be declared dependents of the court. But the trial court's dispositional order was
apparently based on its belief that the mother's clearly diagnosed schizophrenia was per se detrimental enough to her children to justify their removal from her custody. The court of appeal found no clear and convincing evidence of specific
detriment suffered by the children and held that such detriment
could not be inferred from their mother's mental illness.52
It also reasoned that, as in Jeannette S., alternatives existed which might minimize such detriment,83 and that such alternatives must also be weighed against the uncertainties of foster or institutional care and the parental home situation. By
utilizing such alternatives, it would be "possible for the juvenile
court to truly serve the best interests of the children by provid79. 94 Cal. App. 3d 52, 156 Cal. Rptr. 262 (where mother's home was filthy, dog and
cat feces were found on floors, daughter slept on couch due to mess in bedroom and was
sent to school in filthy clothes, removal from parental custody was inappropriate where
household supervision was possible).
80. 274 Cal. App. 2d 199, 78 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1969).
81. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 600(b) (Deering 1979) repealed by Act of Sept. 20,
1976, ch. 1068, § 20, 1976 Cal. Stat. 4782 (recodified at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(d)
(Deering 1983).
82. The court surveyed several medical and psychological essays to conclude that
schizophrenia is a "catch·all" phrase for many types of mental illness with many varied
manifestations and therefore a diagnosis of such was insufficient to support an inference
of detriment.
83. e.g., Parental custody conditioned on mother's continued participation in counseling or supervised custody.
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ing a stable, supervised home environment with their natural
parent instead of penalizing all three for the mother's acknowledgement of her problems. "84
In addition, the court found that if on remand, the trial
court did find that detriment to the children would result from
parental custody, its order must include a plan for reunification
as mandated by California Rule of Court number 1376(b). The
reunification plan must be specific enough to furnish the mother
with notice of the conditions she must meet before she is reunited with her children.
The court in Jaime M. made clear that even in cases where
parents suffer from severe and chronic schizophrenia, their children may not be removed from their custody absent a clear and
convincing showing that such illness would cause actual detriment to the children, and that such removal is essential in light
of all alternatives, including in-home supervision and other conditional forms of parental custody.
2. Expansion of right to temporary visitation pending
conclusive determination of paternity
Gadbois v. Superior Court, 126 Cal. App. 3d 653, 179 Cal.
Rptr. (1st Dist. 1981) addressed the issue of temporary visitation
rights of an alleged father of an illegitimate child prior to a conclusive determination of paternity. The case is unique because
the holding significantly expands a father's right to temporary,
or pendente lite, visitation subsequent to a preliminary determination by a preponderance of the evidence that he is in fact the
father.
The petitioner claimed to be the father of a two year old
child and visited the child extensively for two years. When visitation ceased, he brought suit to establish his paternity by introducing documentary evidence of a blood test proving his
paternity.811
84. Jaime M., 134 Cal. App. 3d at 544, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
85. Gadbois, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 654, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 20. The bloodtest showed a
99.3% chance that he was the father which is important where the father need only
prove his paternity by a preponderance of the evidence.
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A subsequent motion for pendente lite visitation rights was
denied. The trial court declined a preliminary determination of
paternity and denied temporary visitation rights stating that no
irreparable harm would be done if temporary visitation were
postponed. The petitioner challenged the decision contending
that absent a showing that visitation would harm the child, the
court must grant temporary visitation rights.
The court of appeal held that the trial court erred in failing
to consider petitioner's evidence, in failing to make a preliminary determination of paternity, and in refusing to award temporary visitation rights. The court relied on the Family Law
Act,86 rather than the Uniform Parentage Act.87 The court noted
that although the Uniform Parentage Act does not authorize
temporary visitation rights, it does not bar those rights. The
court then turned to section 4601 of the Family Law Act which
states that "reasonable visitation rights shall be awarded to a
parent unless it is shown that such visitation would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. "88 Because a preliminary
determination of paternity had not been made, the trial court
relied on the second half of section 4601 which further states
that "[i]n the discretion of the court, reasonable visitation rights
may be granted to any other person having an interest in the
welfare of the child. "89 The court of appeal chose to follow the
first part of the statute requiring visitation rights based on the
following reasoning.
Although section 4601 is part of the Family Law Act applying to custody, the court noted that based on its holding in In
Re B.G.,sO "[v]isitation rights are a natural companion to custody rights,"SI and therefore section 4601 applies to this paternity action. Once the court established that visitation rights exist in a paternity action under section 4601 and are not barred
by the Uniform Parentage Act, the court then set the standard
for determining when such rights are to be granted. The court
86. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (Deering 1972).
87. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7000-7021. (Deering 1983). This was the statute under which
petitioner filed his paternity action.
88. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (Deering 1972).
89.ld.
90. 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
91. Gadbois, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 656, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
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found that the Civil Code provided no guidelines for such a determination. Therefore, the opinion was based upon case law involving the award of temporary child support pending a paternity determination in cases brought against purported fathers.92
The court correctly reasoned that if a purported father can
be compelled to support a child pending proceedings to establish
his obligations, he must also be afforded the same consideration
for pendente lite visitation rights as would a proven father.
Thus, the court held that the trial court must allow the petitioner to present his evidence in a preliminary determination of
paternity. Then, if by a preponderance of the evidence it is
shown that he is the father, the court must allow him temporary
visitation rights under section 4601, barring evidence that visitation would harm the child.
Gadbois v. Superior Court introduces a new standard for
mandatory visitation rights of fathers of illegitimate children
pending a paternity determination. Past cases have focused on
the mother's rights to child support, while this case concentrates
on the father's rights vis-a-vis his child. The decision is logical
and well reasoned. The absence of case law on the subject renders this decision unique because of the rarity of paternity cases
brought by the father. However, the issue of establishing paternity and temporary child support is not rare. The obvious legal
similarities are striking. In a legal system striving for equality,
this case is a forerunner. This court has finally stated that a
double standard will not be tolerated in the area of parent-child
visitation rights.
C.

SPOUSAL AND CHILD SUPPORT

1. Refusal to order part-time working mother to pay child
support upheld

In re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 646 P.2d 179,
92. City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 87, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 45 (1978); Carbond v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 2d 768, 117 P.2d 872 (1941). These
cases held that the alleged father must be given an opportunity to be heard and to present his evidence showing that he is not the father. If he is proven to be the father by a
preponderance of the evidence, the court would impose pendente lite child support. The
proceeding is only for the determination of child support and is not res judicata on the
issue of paternity at trial.
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183 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1982). The California Supreme Court in In
re Marriage of Flaherty refused to assume that the trial court
had used a sex-biased interpretation of former Civil Code section 196 in denying a custodial father's request for child support
from his ex-wife. In so holding, the court did not reach the issue
of whether such a sex-biased interpretation would be unconstitutional. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by refusing to order a mother who worked only part time to pay
child support, although she testified that she could have worked
full time had she so desired.
While a dissolution action was pending and after a temporary award of custody to a child's father and visitation rights to
the mother, the mother requested a modification to allow joint
custody. The court denied the joint custody request, but modified the visitation order to allow the child to visit the mother
four months per year. The financial statements of both parties
revealed that the mother's income was considerably lower than
that of the father, but that she worked only part time. She testified: (1) that she would spend as much on her daughter in four
months as her ex-husband would spend the rest of the year; and
(2) that she could work full time if she wished and if it were
necessary to support her daughter.
Nevertheless, in its interlocutory decree, the trial court denied the father's request for child support and ordered the parties to share their daughter'S transportation costs. Neither party
requested findings of fact from the trial court. The father appealed, alleging that the trial court applied a sex-biased interpretation of former Civil Code section 196,93 and that the section, as applied, was unconstitutional. The court of appeal
upheld the trial court's decision and the father's petition for rehearing before the California Supreme Court was granted.
Courts may base child and spousal support awards on earning capacity rather than on actual earnings. 94 It is clear that
93. CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (Deering 1971), repealed by Act of Sept. 30, 1980, ch. 1341,
§ 2, 1980 Cal. Stat. 4744.
94. Webber v. Webber, 33 Cal. 2d 153, 160, 199 P.2d 934, 939 (1948); Meagher v.
Meagher, 190 Cal. App. 2d 62, 64, 11 Cal. Rptr. 650, 651 (1961). However, the rule seems
to be appealed only in situations in which the supporting spouse avoids responsibilities
by deliberately reducing earnings. See In re Marriage of Hurtienne, 126 Cal. App. 3d 374,
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whether child support is awarded may no longer be based on the
gender of the custodial parent, according to California Civil
Code section 196. 911 However, former section 196, which was in
effect at the time of trial, was more ambiguous, reading in pertinent part: "The parent entitled to the custody of a child must
give him support and education . . . . If the support . . . which
the father of a legitimate child is able to give is inadequate, the
mother must assist him to the extent of her ability."9s
This section had been interpreted in two ways. Some courts
had interpreted it to hold the father primarily and the mother
secondarily liable for support, regardless of custody.97 Others
had held that the custodial parent had primary liability for support in light of sections 4357 98 and 470099 of the Civil Code, empowering the courts to order either parent to pay spousal or
child support.IOO The emphasis in this second line of cases is on
a balancing of the needs of the children against the relative
hardship to each parent in contributing to such needs. lol
Although there was some lack of clarity regarding the husband's argument in Flaherty, his main contention seemed to be
378, 178 Cal. Rptr. 748, 749 (1982); Philbin v. Philbin, 19 Cal. App. 3d 115, 121,96 Cal.
Rptr. 408, 411-12 (1971).
95. CAL. CIY. CODE § 196 (Deering 1983), enacted by Act of Sept. 30, 1980, ch. 1341,
§ 2, 1980 Cal. Stat. 4744.
96. CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (Deering 1971), repealed by Act of Sept. 30, 1980, ch. 1341,
§ 1, 1980 Cal. Stat. 4744.
97. Fox v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 194 Cal. 173,288 P. 38 (1924) (children denied
"total dependency" presumption for purposes of receiving death benefits for mother's
industrially caused death because mother was not primarily liable under § 196); Stargell
v. Stargell, 263 Cal. App. 2d 504, 69 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1968) (illegitimate child found not to
be on same footing as legitimate child for purposes of determining amount of support
since father was primarily liable for legitimate child in mother's custody under § 196,
whereas both parents were equally liable for illegitimate child under § 196(a)).
98. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4357 (Deering 1983).
99. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4700 (Deering 1983). See also, former §§ 137.2, CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 137.2, repealed by Act of Sept. 4, 1969, ch. 1608, § 3, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3313, and 139,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 139, repealed by Act of Sept. 4, 1969, ch. 1608, § 3, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3313.
100. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 274 Cal. App. 2d 698, 79 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1969) (father's physical custody of children was factor subjecting him to primary liability for
their support under § 196); Smith v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 245 Cal.
App. 2d 292, 53 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1966) (children of mother killed in industrial accident
found to be "totally dependent" and entitled to Workers' Compensation death benefits
because, although her duty was secondary as non-custodial parent, their need for her
support imposed a legal obligation on her under § 196).
101. See, e.g., Levy v. Levy, 245 Cal. App. 2d 341, 53 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1966).
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that because it used a sex-biased interpretation of section 196
(that reflected in the first line of cases above), the trial court
failed to base its support decision on the wife's earning capacity
rather than on her actual earnings as compared to his.l02 The
Supreme Court, however, deferred to the trial court's discretion
in awarding child support. 103
Since neither party had requested findings of fact, the Supreme Court refused to find that the trial court had applied a
sex-biased interpretation of section 196 or based its decision on
the wife's actual earnings. Without such findings as to the number of hours the wife worked or the amount of money she could
make working full time, the Court was obligated to presume that
such facts would support the trial court's decision. 104
Thus, the Supreme Court did not reach the question of
whether a sex-biased interpretation of former section 196 would
be unconstitutional. However, in a footnote, the Court indicated
its opinion that such an interpretation would violate both state
and federal constitutions. 1011
2. Award of family home as child support may not be conditioned on marital status or meretricious relationship
In re Marriage of Escamilla, 127 Cal. App. 3d 963, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 842 (5th Dist. 1982). The court of appeal in In re Marriage
of Escamilla held that an ex-wife's exclusive possession of the
family home as part of a child support award may not be conditioned on her remaining single or on the absence of an unrelated
adult male in her household. Civil Code section 4800(b)(1) authorizes conditional unequal divisions of community property
assets under certain circumstances and such divisions have been
upheld where they form part of a child support award. However,
the court held that the above conditions were impermissible be102. But cf., Philbin v. Philbin, 19 Cal. App. 3d 115, 121, 96 Cal. Rptr. 408, 411·12
(1971) (earning capacity standard applied only when supporting spouse deliberately
avoids responsibilities).
103. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 544 P.2d 941, 126 Cal. Rptr. 805
(1976).
104. Denham v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 557, 468 P.2d 193, 86 Cal. Rptr. 65,
(1970).
105. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,279 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316·17
(1977); Arp v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 393, 563 P.2d 849, 138
Cal. Rptr. 293 (1977) (strict scrutiny standard under California constitution).
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cause they were unrelated to the ex-husband's economic interests in the house or to the children's need to remain in the family home.
In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court awarded exclusive possession of the family home to the wife because the husband was unable to pay child support. This award had the effect
of deferring a completely equal division of the community property until after the eventual sale of the home. The wife's exclusive possession was to terminate upon the happening of any of
several conditions, at which time the parties would be required
to sell the home and divide the proceeds. Among such terminating conditions were the wife's remarrying or an unrelated adult
male moving into the house. loe
Civil Code section 4800(a) mandates an equal division of
community property upon dissolution. l07 However, where economic circumstances warrant, section 4800(b)(1) authorizes exceptions to the strict equal division requirement on conditions
deemed "proper to effect a substantially equal division of the
property. "108
Relying in part on the legislative history of section 4800, the
courts in In re Marriage of Bosemanl09 and In re Marriage of
Herrmann llO held that section 4800(b)(1) allows an award of exclusive possession of the home to the custodial parent where
such home is the main or sole community asset, where there are
minor children, and where the non-custodial parent is unable to
pay child support.111 The court has broad discretion in conditioning such awards so that they benefit the minor chil106. Unchallenged conditions included: (1) the youngest child reaching majority; (2)
the destruction of the property; and (3) an agreement by the parties. Those challenged
but upheld by the court included: (1) the wife's death; (2) the wife's and children's moving from the premises; and (3) the wife's failure to pay her part of the mortgage.
107. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48oo(a) (Deering 1983).
108. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48oo(b)(1) (Deering 1983).
109. 31 Cal. App. 3d 372, 107 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1973).
110. 84 Cal. App. 3d 361, 148 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978).
111. Such an award may be appropriate even when there is no such inability to pay,
88 long 88 the wife's and children's interest in staying in the home outweigh the husband's interest in an immediate equal division. See In re Marriage of Duke, 101 Cal.
App. 3d 152, 158, 161 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447 (1980).
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dren while protecting the non-custodial spouse's economic
interests.1l2
The Escamilla court, however, held that the trial court had
abused its discretion by conditioning the wife's right to exclusive
possession of the home on her remaining single and on the absence of an unrelated adult male in the household.
Because the award was considered in part to be child support, the court reasoned that, according to Davis v. Davis 113 , it
could not be based on the marital status of either parent. Although, if the wife remarried, her community property interest
(including perhaps her new husband's earnings) would be liable
for supporting her children, the court reasoned that such liabil,ity would not, under Civil Code sections 5127.5 114 and 5127.6,1111
relieve the children's father of the duty to support them and as
such would not justify the forced sale of the home.
In addition, neither condition' was found by the court to
have the kind of adverse impact on the husband's property interests which would justify, under section 4800(b)(I), its inclusion as a condition. His emotional interest in keeping another
adult male from the home was not found to be sufficient when
weighed against the children's interest in staying in the home
under those conditions.
In summary, although a court may grant conditional exclusive possession of the family home to the custodial parent, it
may not condition such right to possession on factors such as the
custodial parent's marital status or the absence from the home
of an unrelated adult male, which have no bearing on the economic interests of the non-custodial parent. In other words, it
must impose only conditions which are "proper to effect a substantially equal division of the property."
112. Boseman, 31 Cal. App. 3d at 375-76,107 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35; Herrman, 84 Cal.
App. 3d at 365, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53.
113. 68 Cal. 2d 290, 291, 437 P.2d 502, 503, 66 Cal. Rptr. 14, 15 (1968).
114. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.5 (Deering 1972).
115. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.6 (Deering 1983).
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3. Husband's earnings are liable for support of his wife's
children from previous marriage
In re Marriage of Havens, 125 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 477 (1st Dist. 1981), the court of appeal held that upon a
Motion for Modification of Child Support under Civil Code sections 196, 242, 687, 5105, 5125, and 5127.5 a court must examine
the wife's community property interest from her present marriage, including her present husband's income, to determine if
there has been a change of circumstances in her financial status.
Prior to the enactment of section 5127.5, a court could not require that the present husband's earnings be used for support of
his wife's child from a previous marriage.
In re Marriage of Havens is a partially erroneous interpretation of the law based solely on the court's review of section
5127.5. The court failed to include a review of section 5127.6
which only requires such an assessment of the present husband's
earnings regarding the support of a child who is living with him,
not of a child living with his natural father.

The facts of the case indicate that Sandra Havens was
awarded custody of her two boys, David and Daniel. A year or
two later (the record is unclear), David went to live with his father. At that time, Ronald Havens was the child's sole supporter
as Sandra's monthly income was considerably less than Ronald's. Both parties remarried and their combined community
property income was substantially the same. Ronald filed a motion with the superior court to modify child support alleging
change of circumstances. He also requested that the court issue
written findings of fact on the matter. Both the motion and the
request were denied and Ronald appealed contending that Simdra should bear a portion of the parental duty to support David
and Daniel. He also contended that the court erroneously denied
his request for written findings of fact. liS
Prior to the enactment of section 5127.5, a husband was not
bound to use his income to maintain his wife's children by a for116. On the second contention, the court explained that Civil Code section 4700,
enacted after the superior court proceedings, explicitly provides for written findings of
fact where support of a minor child is at issue whether it be on a motion or a judgment.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4700 (Deering 1983).
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mer husband. ll7 Such support was only required if in loco
parentis was established-if the husband took voluntary steps
to offer emotional or economic support to the child. Section
5127.5, which was relied upon by the court, succeeded the previous statutes stating that, "[t]he wife's interest in the community
property, including the earnings of her husband, is liable for the
support of her children to whom the duty to support is owed
"118

o

In its opinion, the court stated that "Ronald and Sandra
had an equal duty to support David and Daniel. And each of
them had an equal right to use the community income of his, or
her, subsequent marriage for that purpose."111 The court's reasoning was based in numerous statutes stating that the father
and mother have an equal responsibility to support their children. 12o The court also concluded that there is a duty to support,121 that community property is property acquired by husband or wife during marriage,122 that the community property
interest is an equal one,123 that each spouse, acting in good faith,
has the management and control of the community property,124
and as stated above, that the wife's interest in the community
property, including the earnings of her husband, is liable for
child support. m The court stated that the trial court did not
appropriately apply these statutes and therefore remanded the
case for further consideration.
The court of appeal failed to mention section 5127.6 which
also states that such community property interest (husband's income) "shall be considered unconditionally available for the care
and support of any child who resides with the child's natural or
adoptive parent who is married to such spouse."126 In light of
such an oversight, the court's instructions are unclear. It seems
to imply that Sandra's community property interest should be
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120 (Deering 1983).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.5 (Deering 1972).
In re Marriage of Havens 125 Cal. App. 3d at 1015, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (Deering 1983).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 242 (Deering 1983).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 687 (Deering 1971).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5105 (Deering 1983).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (Deering 1983).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.5 (Deering 1972).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.6 (Deering 1983) (Emphasis Added).
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assessed in determining her cluty to support both Daniel, who
lives with her, and David, who lives with his natural father. Such
an implication is an erroneous interpretation of the law.
The court succeeds in establishing case law supporting the
legislature's enactment of sections 5127.5 and 5127.6 clarifying
that the community property interests of the wife in a subsequent marriage are to be evaluated in determining child support.
This case must be read with caution before concluding that the
holding also applies to economic support of a child not living
with his/her mother and her subsequent husband. On this point,
the statute is clear and the case is not. Both require the use of
community interests from subsequent marriages for child support. While the court is unclear in its decision, the statute expressly states that such income can only be required to support
a child living with that subsequent spouse.
..

In re Marriage of Havens conclusively upholds section
5127.5 requiring a husband to use his income to support his
wife's child by a former marriage if the child's home is with his
mother. The failure of the court to mention section 5127.6 leaves
open the question of community property support of a child not
living with his/her mother and her present husband. Had the
court addressed section 5127.6 then it would be clear that the
court interpreted the statutory language as including support of
a child living with the other parent. The absence of the section
could be an indication of its unimportance or it could be construed as an oversight, to be addressed more thoughtfully in a
subsequent case.
4. Spousal support issue to remain undecided for reasonable period where husband is unemployed through no fault of
his own
In re Marriage of Hurtienne, 126 Cal. App. 3d 374, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 748 (2d Dist. 1981). The court in In re Marriage of Hurtie nne held that when a divorcing husband is not deliberately or
intentionally unemployed, the proper standard for awarding
spousal support should generally be his actual earnings rather
than his earning potential. When the husband has become unemployed through no fault of his own, the spousal support issue
should remain undecided for a reasonable time period (here 90
Women's Law Forum

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss3/8

32

King: California Law Survey

1983]

CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY

763

days). During that time, the husband has an opportunity to
prove good faith by seeking employment. Hurtienne implied
that if during the 90 day period the husband deliberately
avoided employment, the court could apply an "earning potential" standard in awarding support.
Shortly before the trial for dissolution of marriage, husband
was discharged from his long term employment due to a reduction in personnel. The trial court used his earning potential, as
evidenced by his previous employment, in awarding support to
wife. However, because he was unemployed at the time, the trial
court delayed his first spousal support payment for 30 days. The
appellate court reversed the spousal support decision on two
grounds. It held, first, that the "earning potential" standard was
inappropriate in such a case, and second, that 30 days was not a
.reasonable period in which to expect husband to find a job comparable to his past employment.
Two standards have been used in California in awarding
spousal support. The "earning potential" standard has been advocated because, "[i]f the court were limited to the momentary
current earnings of a husband, . . . the court would get a distorted view of his financial potential. "127 The standard seems to
have been used, however, only where the husband has deliberately or intentionally caused a reduction in his actual earnings
or avoided employment. For instance, in one case the husband
deliberately quit his job at the time he sought a divorce. us The
second standard bases support payments on the husband's actual earnings. Courts seem to apply this standard when the husband's earnings are low or non-existent through no fault of his
own. 11l9 The court in Hurtienne applied this standard.
The appellate court recognized that the trial court had allowed the husband 30 days in which to seek employment commensurate with his earning potential, but held that such a pe-

.

127. Meagher v. Meagher, 190 Cal. App. 2d 62, 64, 11 Cal. Rptr. 650, 651 (1961).
128. [d. at 63, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 651. See also, In re Marriage of Rome, 109 Cal. App.
3d 961, 167 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1980).
129. Philbin v. Philbin, 19 Cal. App. 3d 115, 121, 96 Cal. Rptr. 408, 412 (1971) (reduction in support based on reduction in husband's actual earnings upheld based on
evidence that husband had not deliberately depressed his income). See also, In re Marriage of Reese, 73 Cal. App. 3d 120, 125, 140 Cal. Rptr. 589, 592 (1977) (above analysis
applied to initial support award).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983

33

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 8

764

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:731

riod was too short to justify use of the "earning potential"
standard. The appellate court's approach was to continue to
award spousal support for 90 days to allow the husband to seek
work. The court found it unreasonable for support payments to
begin automatically at a previously established amount based on
the husband's earning potential. Instead, a 90 day continuance
would allow the court to decide which standard to apply, based
on whether the husband sought employment in good faith or
avoided doing SO.130
The continuance approach as used in Hurtienne carries the
potential for abuse. If 90 days is routinely used as the "reasonable period" it may be abused by spouses who might be expected
to find employment in less time. However, Hurtienne actually
held only that the continuance should be for a reasonable time
and that in this case 90 days was reasonable. Abuse can be
avoided if courts determine the time period on a case by case
basis. Courts should weigh the husband's type of employment
and potential difficulty in finding work against the fact that the
wife will not only be without support for a time, but will also be
without the ability to rely on a specific future award in budgeting for her family's needs.
The court in Hurtienne adopted the view that an "earning
potential" standard should not be used in awarding spousal and
child support unless there is bad faith on the part of the husband in depressing his earnings. The court also applied a new
approach in determining whether such bad faith exists. This approach, allows the husband a reasonable time in which to show a
good faith effort to meet his responsibilities. However, it does
leave unresolved for a time the important issue of spousal and
child support, to the possible detriment of the dependent wife
and children.
130. This approach was first used in In re Marriage of Rome, 109 Cal. App. 3d 961,
167 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1980) to protect wife from potentially permanent reduction in support based on ex-husband's actual earnings. Court gave wife 90 days in which to prove
that ex-husband was deliberately avoiding responsibilities and that therefore earning potential standard was appropriate. Hurtienne is the first case to use this approach to
protect husband's interests.
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5. Support award of bankrupt spouse reduced by amount
of discharge debt
In re Marriage of Clements, 134 Cal. App. 3d 737, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 756 (1st Dist. 1982). In In re Marriage of Clements, the
court of appeal held that an ex-wife's support award could be
reduced when her ex-husband assumed obligation for a community debt which had been awarded to her as part of a property
settlement. Although she had discharged such debt in bankruptcy, and reduction of her support award admittedly frustrated such discharge, the court held that California law is not
preempted by federal bankruptcy laws in the area of spousal
support.

Husband, a dentist, and wife, a homemaker, had been married approximately 20 years. Upon dissolution of their marriage,
community debts and assets were divided equally and wife was
awarded spousal support and ordered to hold her husband
harmless from liability for the debts awarded to her. Wife was
unable to generate enough income to pay her debts and was
eventually adjudged bankrupt. The creditors then turned to
husband, who began making payments and requested a modification in the support he was paying to wife. The family law
court granted a modification offsetting his monthly payments to
the creditors and wife appealed.
The policy supporting discharging debts through bankruptcy is to provide a debtor with, "a new opportunity in life
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure
and discouragement of pre existing debt."13l California clearly
provides for a modification of support based on a change in economic circumstances,132 including a newly incurred indebtedness
or expense. 133 In addition, Civil Code section 4812 as amended in
1977134 authorizes a court to treat the discharge in bankruptcy of
an obligation from a property settlement as a change in circumstances and to modify support accordingly. The circumstances
considered in setting_ or modifying an award include the needs of
131. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
132. Dean v. Dean, 59 Cal. 2d 655, 381 P.2d 944, 31 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1963); Engelberg
v. Engelberg, 257 Cal. App. 2d 821, 824-25, 65 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271-72 (1968).
133. Dean, 59 Cal. 2d 655, 381 P.2d 944, 31 Cal. Rptr. 64.
134. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4812 (Deering 1983).
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the parties, their abilities to meet their needs, the property they
own, their obligations and their actual and potential earnings. 131!
The court in Clements considered the tension between the
federal bankruptcy policy, which would support wife's right to
be free from any liability for discharged debts, and the state
court's interest in the equal division of community debts and
assets. It cited two cases which had dealt with this tension.
In In Re Paderewski v. Barrett,t3s community debts were
ordered to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the community residence before such proceeds were equally divided. Wife
was adjudged bankrupt and, upon sale of the house, her trustee
in bankruptcy was awarded half the proceeds before payment of
the community debts. Husband appealed and the circuit court
reversed, holding that the bankrupt's, and therefore the trustee's
interests in the property were limited by the divorce decree.
In In re Marriage of Cohen,137 the husband was adjudged
bankrupt between his separation from his wife and dissolution.
In his bankruptcy petition, he listed several community debts,
which were discharged as to him. The court refused to reassign
to him his share of the community debts so discharged, holding
that "any provision ... requiring payment by husband of these
discharged obligations, whether to wife or others, would be contrary to the federal supremacy clause ... of the United States
Constitution. "138
The Clements court recognized that the Cohen fact situation was more compelling than that in Paderewski. 189 In fact, it
noted that requiring direct payment of the debts by wife out of
the sale of community property l40 would probably "have suffered from the same infirmity as the proposed order in . . .
Cohen."141
135. Mall v. Mall, 42 Cal. 2d 435, 442, 267 P.2d 249, 253 (1954).
136. 564 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1977).
137. 105 Cal. App. 3d 836, 164 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1980).
138. [d. at 843, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (emphasis added).
139. Since there was no provision for payment of community debts out of the sale of
property or any specific fund set aside for such payment, Clements was distinguishable
from Paderewski.
140. The trial court had initially ordered such payment.
141. Clements, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 744·45, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
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The court distinguished Cohen, however, because the focus
in that case was on payments to discharged creditors, whereas in
Clements it was on spousal support. It held that since the area
of domestic relations has been left exclusively to the states,142
the federal bankruptcy policy does not preclude modification of
a support award to reflect discharged debts. Therefore, the court
held that the trial court had not abused its discretion by modifying the support award,143 although wife's inability to meet her
needs seemed clear in light of her bankruptcy, and husband was
a dentist with a steady income.
In effect, the result was the same as it would have been had
the court continued support payments at the previous rate and
ordered the wife to pay the debts directly. It is difficult to see
how a change in "focus" with the same effect is sufficient to distinguish Clements from Cohen, wherein it was held that federal
bankruptcy policy precluded the court from requiring payment
of discharged debts, to the ex-spouse or others. In this respect,
it appears that Clements is inconsistent with Cohen, despite the
court's change in "focus."
D.

HEALTH AND WELFARE

1. Medically necessary hysterectomy does not violate prohibition against sterilization of conservatees

Maxon v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 626, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 516 (3d Dist. 1982). In Maxon v. Superior Court, the court
of appeal held that section 2356(d) of the Probate Code, prohibiting the court from authorizing the sterilization of a conservatee, does not apply to a medically necessary hysterectomy
which incidentally renders the conservatee sterile. Using a "clear
and convincing" standard of medical necessity, the court authorized the conservator of a mentally disturbed woman to consent
to a hysterectomy where it was shown that there was an 80 percent chance the conservatee would develop invasive cervical cancer and where alternative treatments were contraindicated because of her mental illness.
142. Ohio Ex rei. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930).
143. The standard used on review was whether any reasonable judge could have
made such an order. In re Marriage of Melton, 107 Cal. App. 3d 559, 564, 165 Cal. Rptr.
753, 757 (1980).
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Alexandra, a mentally unstable woman, was diagnosed as
having a pre-cancerous condition of the cervix, with an 80 percent chance that it would develop into invasive cervical cancer.
According to doctors, such cancer would lead to a prolonged condition that could be treated only by radiation therapy. Three
choices of treatment were generally recommended for the precancerous condition. The first two required a high degree of cooperation from a patient over a prolonged follow-up period. The
third was a total abdominal hysterectomy which would render
the patient sterile.
Because of Alexandra's mental condition and uncooperative
nature as a patient, three doctors recommended a hysterectomy
as the only possible successful pre-cancer treatment. According
to these doctors, the cure rate by hysterectomy in such cases was
very nearly 100 percent. Alexandra would not and/or could not
consent to the hysterectomy, and her conservator petitioned the
court under Probate Code section 2357 144 for authorization to
consent for her.
Section 2357 $ets out the procedure for a conservator to request authorization to consent to non-emergency medical treatment which was not previously authorized and for which the
conservatee is unable to give an informed consent. Section
2357(h)1411 requires the court to make three findings before authorizing such treatment: (1) the recommended treatment is
medically required; (2) if untreated, the condition will probably
become life-endangering or seriously threaten the conservatee's
health; and (3) the conservatee is unable to give an informed
consent to the treatment. However, Probate Code section
2356(d)146 provides that, "no ... conservatee may be sterilized
under the provisions of this division."

Buck u. Bell,147 a United States Supreme Court case decided
in 1927, reflects the then pervasive attitude regarding the procreative rights of mentally ill and retarded people. The Court
struck down a substantive due process attack under the four144.
145.
146.
147.

CAL. PROD. CODE § 2357 (Deering 1981).
CAL. PROD. CODE § 2357(h) (Deering 1981).
CAL. PROD. CODE § 2356(d) (Deering 1981).
274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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teenth amendment against a Virginia statute authorizing the
sterilization of hereditary "mental defectives," saying essentially
that three generations of mental defectives was enough. Since
that time, as procreation has come to be seen as a fundamental
right,148 courts' attitudes toward the sterilization of conservatees
has changed,149 although Buck v. Bell has not been explicitly
overturned.
Because of the fundamental nature of the right involved,
the California courts have refused to order sterilization absent
specific legislative authorization. In Guardianship of Kemp/ISO a .
conservator appeared before a probate court to request an order
for sterilization of his conservatee. The appellate court reversed
the resulting probate court order, finding that the probate
court's limited jurisdiction did not include the right to order
sterilization. But in Guardianship of Tulley/lSI the court made
clear that not even a court with general equity jurisdiction could
violate the fundamental right of procreation by ordering sterilization, absent specific statutory authorization. This was true
even though sterilization was in the best medical and social interests of the conservatee.
Even in light of the above historical movement toward recognizing procreation as a fundamental right despite medical and
social needs, the court in Maxon authorized Alexandra's hysterectomy. Certainly, it was presented with a stronger medical case
that were the courts in Kemp and Tulley, but even so the
court's reasoning is troublesome.
Tulley specifically held that without statutory authoriza-

tion, sterilization could
fundamental nature of
quirement of statutory
find such authorization

not be ordered. While recognizing the
the right involved and the Tulley reauthorization, the court here seems to
in section 2356(d) simply because it is

148. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Cf, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972).
149. See e.g., Matter of A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 368 (Colo. 1981).
150. 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974).
151. 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1978) (guardian'S petition for sterilization order denied although 20 year old ward had mentality of 3 year old, was unable to
understand or care for sanitary needs in connection with her menstrual cycle, and pregnancy would cause her psychiatric harm).
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said to be "consistent with [Kemp and Tulley]."IG2 From this,
the court concludes that that section is "inapplicable in cases in
which the purpose of the proposed surgery is to protect the life
of the incompetent rather than to prevent her from bearing children," and warns in a footnote that its decision should be read
to apply only where the condition will probably become life-endangering. However, section 2346(d) alone does not authorize
courts to order medically necessary sterilization, as Tulley required. It is difficult to understand how the court could find
'such a meaning in section 2346(d) when it says merely that no
conservatee may be sterilized under the division.
There are perhaps other provisions, such as the "medically
required treatment" procedures under section 2357,1113 which
might be read to permit the court to authorize sterilization of a
coriservatee under certain circumstances. However, even these
provisions could be read to be limited by section 2356(d), in
light of the fundamental nature of procreative rights.
Certainly, as the court concludes, an elevated standard of
proof is essential in a case which threatens a fundamental right.
Th~ court requires clear and convincing evidence of medical necessity and a finding that a hysterectomy is the least instrusive
means of achieving the objective. However, the line between a
"medically and socially indicated" hysterectomy and one which
is "medically necessary" may prove to be a difficult one for
courts to draw by any standard of proof. The situation is even
more hazardous when the conservatee actually refuses to consent
and is also found to be incapable of doing so. It should be kept
in mind that a person who is considered "normal" would be allowed to choose to take the 20 percent chance that .she might
not develop cervical cancer in order to preserve her fundamental
right to bear children.

152. Law Revision Commission Comment to CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d).
153. These were enacted in 1979 (one year after Tulley) and became effective on
January 1, 1981.
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PATERNITY ACTIONS

Constitutionality
paternity
1.

of

conclusive

presumption

of

In re Marriage of B., 124 Cal. App. 3d 524, 177 Cal. Rptr.
429 (2d Dist. 1981); Watkins v. Riley 83 D.A.R. 182 (4th Dist.
1983). In In re Marriage of B., the court of appeal rejected a
constitutional challenge to Evidence Code section 621 as it was
amended effective September 30, 1980. Although a tissue-typing
test conclusively demonstrated that a husband was not the biological father of his wife's child, the court held that such a test
could not overcome the conclusive presumption of section 621
when the child was over two years old at the time the husband
filed for dissolution of his marriage and sought to establish nonpaternity. In Watkins v. Riley, the court declared section 621
unconstitutional as applied to a six year old child's attempt to
establish paternity in her mother's husband. 1M

In In re Marriage of B., husband filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage and subsequently amended the petition to
delete the allegation that a minor child had been born of the
marriage. The child was over two years old at the time of filing,
and had been conceived while husband, not impotent at the
time, was living with child's mother. At trial, husband sought to
introduce an HLA test UU1 which demonstrated that he could not
be the biological father. He challenged the constitutionality of
Evidence Code section 621/ 116 under which the trial court held
him conclusively presumed to be the father and therefore liable
for child support. Husband appealed.
In Watkins, plaintiff minor child sought to establish the paternity of her mother's current husband. At trial, she requested
blood tests to establish that her mother's ex-husband (defendant), with whom her mother lived when daughter was conceived, was not her natural father. Without ordering the blood
154. See also, Estate of Cornelius, 133 Cal. App. 3d 684, 184 Cal. Rptr. 148 (4th
Dist. 1982) h'g. granted Sept. 8, 1982 (L.A. 31631) (upholding constitutionality of section
621 as applied to adult child of deceased alleged natural father).
155. Human leucocyte antigen test, a tissue grouping test done on mother, child,
and alleged father. Such test establishes only whether the man is one who could be the
biological father.
156. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (Deering 1983).
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tests, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment pursuant to section 621's conclusive presumption.
Plaintiff appealed.
Section 621 (a) establishes a conclusive presumption of paternity in a husband when a child is born of his wife with whom
he cohabits. Notwithstanding that presumption, subsections (b),
(c) and (d) of section 621 allow such husband, or the child's
mother,lII'7 to establish non-paternity if "all the experts" conclude as a result of blood tests that he could not be the father.
But under subsections (c) and (d), the husband or mother must
raise the notice of motion for blood tests within two years of the
child's birth or the presumption remains intact. As to all others,
including the child, the presumption is conclusive and may not
be challenged with blood tests.
The presumption was first justified by the courts on the
ground that no competent evidence existed to prove who was the
biological father of a child.1II8 After blood test evidence became
scientifically reliable, the California Supreme Court, in Kusior v.
Silver,1a9 continued to uphold the presumption as a "substantive
rule of law."lso Such rule was based on the public policy of protecting the legitimacy of children born to married people who
live together, regardless of the identities of their biological fathers. lsl Section 621(b) was adopted in 1980, perhaps in recognition of the fact that, after a certain age the identities of children's biological parents lose importance in comparison with the
identities of those who have "parented" them. ls2 Section 621 as
157. The child's mother may establish the non-paternity of her husband only if the
child's biological father files an affidavit acknowledging paternity.
158. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1972) (irrebuttable presumption unconstitutional when not necessarily and universally true in fact and when reasonable
alternative means to make crucial determination exist).
159. 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960).
160. In other words, even though it is conclusively proved he is not the biological
father, a man can still be a child's legal father if the conditions of section 621 exist. See
Jackson v. Jackson, 67 Cal. 2d 245, 430 P.2d 289, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1967).
161. Jackson, 67 Cal. 2d at 249-50, 430 P.2d at 291-92, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 651-52
(Burke, J. dissenting). See also, County of San Diego v. Brown, 80 Cal. App. 3d 297, 303,
145 Cal. Rptr. 483, 486 (1978) (purposes of § 621 are to uphold the integrity of the family, protect the child from the stigma of illegitimacy, protect the child's welfare, and keep
the child off welfare rolls).
162. See Recent Developments, California's Tangled Web: Blood Tests and the
Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy, 20 STAN. L. REV. 754 (1968) (suggesting just such
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amended may have been a compromise between recognizing the
reliability of blood tests and encouraging the continuance of and
responsibility toward developed parent-child relationships.
In In re Lisa R./63 the California Supreme Court found a
similar presumption16• to be unconstitutional as applied to a
child's biological father seeking to establish his own paternity.
The court held that the father's interest in presenting evidence
where his claim of paternity arose from more than the mere biological relationship 161i overcame the state's interest in speed and
efficiency of judicial proceedings. 166
In Marriage of B., husband challenged the constitutionality
of section 621 as amended, on two grounds: (1) that the decisional law upholding the original section had developed before
the sophistication of blood tests became reliable to the point of
conclusiveness, and that the section now works a denial of due
process since there is no longer a relationship between the presumption and the fact sought to be presumed; and (2) that as a
husband with a child over two years old at the time the section
was amended, he was denied equal protection of the laws by the
limitation imposed by section 621(c).
The court rejected both of husband's contentions. First, as
to the due process claim, it noted that Kusior had not been
overruled and held it is as applicable to the legislature's retention of the presumption, apparently for public policy reasons, as
it had been to the original presumption itself. The court interpreted the two year limit as merely a remedial statute of limitaa rule as § 621 as amended, for the reasons stated above).
163. 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975) cert. den. sub. nom.
Porzuczek, Guardian v. Towner, 421 U.S. 1014 (1975), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 885 (1975).
164. CAL. EVID. CODE § 661 (Deering 1966) repealed by Act of October I, 1975, ch.
1244, § 14, 1975 Cal. Stat. 3194. (child of a married woman presumed to be legitimate
and such presumption may be disputed only by the state, husband, wife or a decedent of
one or both of them, thus making such presumption conclusive as to the alleged natural
father).
165. Here, father had lived with child's mother both before and after child's birth,
had contributed support and attempted to visit the child, the mother had used the father's name, and his name appeared on the child's birth certificate.
166. The state's interests in strengthening family ties, preventing the stigma of illegitimacy, and keeping families intact were held to be non-applicable to this case as both
mother and her husband were dead and father had shown an intent to legitimate his
daughter.
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tions which does not destroy fundamental rights. Second, on
husband's equal protection claim, the court held that because
the statute of limitations did not deprive him of a vested right,
but was merely a limitation on a, newly created right, it was
constitutional.
In Watkins, plaintiff child claimed: (1) that because there
were more reliable methods of determining paternity than
presuming it to be true, the presumption as applied to her violated due process; and (2) that because the statute denied her
the fundamental right to "establish a relationship with a parent,1Il87 it denied her equal protection of the laws.
Recognizing the substantive nature of section 621, the court
nevertheless distinguished this case from Marriage of B. on the
due process claim, by holding that the presumption as applied
here did not further the section's underlying policies of promoting the integrity of the family unit, preventing the stigma of illegitimacy, and ensuring support of the child. The court found
that allowing plaintiff to establish paternity in her mother's current husband would promote the integrity of the family unit in
which she was residing, and that there was no danger of illegitimacy or non-support where her alleged natural father had voluntarily assumed the parent role.
On the equal protection claim, the court held that the statute distinguished between the class of children and that of
mothers and presumed fathers, thereby denying the child the
fundamental right to establish a relationship with a parent. Because section 621 as applied here did not fulfill its own objectives, the court could find no compelling state interest to justify
such a denial.
The court in Watkins concluded by noting that the policies
discussed in Marriage of B. upholding section 621's statute of
limitations might also apply to a child seeking to establish paternity, but that it was unconstitutional to deny the child all
rights to establish such a relationship.
The court's differing treatment of Marriage of B. and Wat167. See Ruddock v. Ohls, 91 Cal. App. 3d 271, 277-78, 154 Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (1979).
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kins seems to derive mainly from the fact that in Marriage of B.,
a man sought to avoid paternity, whereas in Watkins, (and Lisa
R.) plaintiffs sought to legitimate an existing family relationship. It is apparent that in the latter situation, the justifications
for section 621 's conclusive presumption of paternity no longer
outweigh the conclusiveness of sophisticated blood tests.

F.

MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIPS

1. Meretricious relationship is not "remarriage" justifying termination of spousal support
In re Marriage of Sasson, 129 Cal. App .. 3d 140, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 815 (2d Dist. 1982). In In re Marriage of Sasson, the court
of appeal held that an ex-wife who was living in a meretricious
relationship, and representing herself to family and friends as
married, was not "remarried" for purposes of terminating the
non-modifiable spousal support award paid by her ex-husband.
The court rejected the ex-husband's contentions that under California Civil Code section 4801.5 his ex-wife's cohabitation was
tantamount to marriage and that it was inequitable to allow her
to collect spousal support while she was involved in a meretricious relationship.

Upon dissolution of their marriage, Mr. and Mrs. Sasson
(ex-husband and ex-wife) agreed upon an unequivocally nonmodifiable support award which would terminate upon the
death of either ex-spouse, the ex-wife's remarriage or the passage of eight years, whichever came first. Since that time, the ex~
wife had begun cohabiting with another man whose name she
regularly used. She and the man had a baby who was also given
his name. They shared a joint bank account into which she deposited her spousal support checks, and they represented to
family and friends that they were married. They were, however,
never actually married.
Upon the trial court's denial of his request for termination
of spousal support, the ex-husband appealed, alleging that the
trial court erred in defining "marriage" narrowly as de jure or
putative marriage, in excluding reputation evidence, and in ruling that Civil Code section 4801.5 was inapplicable where the
parties had agreed to a non-modifiable support award.
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The court of appeal held that it would contravene public
policy to broaden the definition of marriage beyond that prescribed in Civil Code sections 4100 166, 4101 169, 4104 170, 4213 171
and 4425. 172 According to these sections, marriage requires not
only consent, but also solemnization, and usually a license.
In light of this limited definition, the court also upheld the
trial court's exclusion of reputation evidence. Although such evidence is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule,173 it simply
is of little relevance where by definition the ex-husband must
prove solemnization as well as consent.
Furthermore, the court rejected the ex-husband's contention that the legislature, through Civil Code section 4801.5, m
had demonstrated an intent to treat cohabitation as the
equivalent of ,marriage for purposes of terminating support. At
one time, section 4801.5 did mandate revocation of support upon
proof that supported ex-spouses were cohabiting and holding
themselves out as being married. However, it was amended in
19761711 to create a rebuttable presumption of a decreased need
for support when supported ex-spouses cohabit, even when they
do not represent themselves as being married. This section does
not apply if the parties have agreed otherwise in writing.
In In re Marriage of Harris ,176 the court held that a nonmodifiable support award similar to the one in Sa.sson, could not
be terminated when the ex-wife was cohabiting, though not representing herself as married. The court reasoned that the existence of sufficient facts to invoke section 4801.5 is not equal to
marriage, especially since the parties could have had the benefit
of the section simply by making their support agreement
168. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (Deering 1983).
169. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4101 (Deering 1983).
170. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4104 (Deering 1983).
171. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4213 (Deering 1983).
172. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4425 (Deering 1972) (sets up conditions under which facially
valid marriages are voidable.) Without citing to it, the court also made reference to section 4426, which makes marriages suffering from section 4425 defects valid if not challenged within a specified period. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4426 (Deering 1983).
173. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1314 (Deering 1966).
174. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801.5 (Deering 1983).
175. Act of July 8, 1976, ch. 380, § I, 1976 Cal. Stat. 1028.
176. 65 Cal. App. 3d 143, 134 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1976).
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modifiable. 177
The Sasson court reasoned similarly that: 1) the 1976
amendment of section 4801.5 clarified the legislature's intent
that cohabitation, even when a couple represents themselves as
married, is not the equivalent of marriage; and 2) section 4801.5
is inapplicable to a non-modifiable spousal support award because the parties had "agreed otherwise in writing" to forego its
protection.
The court also rejected the ex-husband's contention that it
was inequitable to allow the ex-wife to "get the best of both
worlds" by living as if she were married, but continuing to receive spousal support. The court pointed out the many benefits
one foregoes when one chooses not to get married (i.e., state
death benefits) and characterized the ex-wife's decision to continue receiving support as choice between two packages of benefits and detriments rather than as an attempt to hoard only
benefits.
In light of courts' refusal to expand the narrow definition of
marriage to the benefit of. a meretricious spouse in such contexts as state benefits and wrongful death,I78 it certainly would
have been inequitable to have expanded it here to ex-wife's
detriment.
Marriage, as defined by the Sasson court, is limited to de
jure or putative marriage and neither reputation evidence, nor
the rebuttable presumption in Civil Code section 4801.5, nor the
alleged inequity of allowing a meretricious spouse to receive
spousal support serves to change that definition.
2. Administrative Code section limiting prisoners' conjugal visits to bona fide family relationships upheld
In re Cummings, 30 Cal. 3d 870, 640 P.2d 1101, 180 Cal.
177. See also In re Marriage of Leib, 80 Cal. App. 3d 629,145 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1978)
(reduction of modifiable support award granted only after ex-wife failed to overcome the
4801.5 presumption since her cohabitation by itself was insufficient to revoke or reduce
her award).
178. See Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 133 Cal. App. 3d 890, 184 Cal. Rptr. 390
(1982). But see Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503
(1983).
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Rptr. 826 (1982). In In re Cummings, the California Supreme
Court rejected a prisoner's challenge to Administrative Code
section 3174 limiting overnight family visitation privileges to bonafide family relationships established through "blood, marriage
or adoption." The Court held that Penal Code section 2600,
granting prisoners all civil rights that do not interfere with reasonable security, did not render section 3174 arbitrary and unreasonable when applied to a prisoner who wished overnight visitation privileges with a woman and her daughter with whom he
had lived for seven years.
Plaintiff prisoner, an inmate serving a life sentence, sought
family visitation rights with a woman and her daughter with
whom he had been living the seven years prior to his arrest. The
couple was not married, nor was the child his natural or adopted
daughter. The relationship had continued during the period of
plaintiff's incarceration by way of letters and daytime visits. The
Department of Corrections denied conjugal visits based on Administrative Code section 3174.179 In this Habeas Corpus action,
plaintiff attempted to have the regulation declared invalid under
Penal Code section 2600. 180
Administrative Code section 3174 provides in pertinent
part:
The family visiting plan will extend such visits to
as many inmates as possible commensurate with
institution security. . . . (a) For the purposes of
family visiting . . . immediate family members
are defined as the inmate's legal spouse; natural
parents; adoptive parents. . . step-parents or foster parents; grandparents; brothers and sisters;
the inmate's natural and adoptive children; stepchildren or grandchildren. 181

Penal Code section 2600, as amended in 1975, provides in pertinent part: "A person sentenced to imprisonment in a state
prison may. . . be deprived of such rights, and only such rights,
as is necessary in order to provide for the reasonable. . . protec179.
180.
181.

tit. 15, R. 3174 (1982).
§ 2600 (Deering 1980).
CODE tit. 15, R. 3174 (1982).

CAL. ADMIN. CODE
CAL. PENAL CODE
CAL. ADMIN.
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tion of the public."lS2 In In re Price/ s3 the California Supreme
Court allowed only a consideration of reasonable institutional
security or public protection in determining whether or not a
prisoner's civil rights were to be denied. Recognizing prison security as a legitimate state interest, the court banned a visit by
outside members of the Prisoner's Union as a security risk. ls4
The Court in Cummings did not focus on the question of
security, but rather focused on the reasonableness of section
3174 and whether it was consistent with a legitimate state interest. lSII Holding that Penal Code section 2600 should not be "a
straightjacket limiting the ability of the prison authorities to
deal with institutional realities," the Court ignored the question
of security which is, according to section 2600, the perspective
from which the reasonableness of section 3174 must be judged.
To justify its position, the Court erroneously relied on cases decided prior to 1975 when the "civil death" presumption was
abolished. ls8
Justice Bird concurred with the court's judgment but not
with its reasoning. She focused directly on the issue ignored by
the majority and concluded that without a reasonable method
for determining what constitutes a bona fide alternative family,
a policy allowing meretricious conjugal visits would present se182. A profound result of the 1975 amendment to section 2600 was that it reversed
the presumption of "civil death," or suspension of all civil rights of a person sentenced to
state prison. In re Price, 25 Cal. 3d 448, 600 P.2d 1330, 158 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1979). Prior
to 1975, section 2600 read in pertinent part: "A sentence of imprisonment in a state
prison for any term suspends all the civil rights of the person so sentenced. . . . But the
Adult Authority may restore . . . such civil rights as the authority may deem
proper.... " CAL. PENAL CODE §, 2600 (Deering 1971).
183. 25 Cal. 3d 448, 600 P.2d 1330, 158 Cal. Rptr. 873.
184. Other cases in which the Supreme Court utilized the "reasonable security" test
are: In re Reynolds, 25 Cal. 3d 131, 599 P.2d 86, 157 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1979) and In re
Brandt, 25 Cal. 3d 136, 599 P.2d 89, 157 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1979). In these cases, the Court
held that a mere conjecture of security problems by the prison officials is not enough to
justify denying rights, but that a clear showing of something more than simple disapproval of the activity is required.
185. In determining whether preventing conjugal visits between unmarried people is
a "legitimate state interest," the court expressed concerns about using taxpayers' money
to "provide overnight housing accommodations and security supervision for a prison inmate with his or her paramour." The use of the word "paramour" is demonstrative of the
majority's bias. It is defined as: "an illicit lover; esp. MISTRESS." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 611 (7th ed. 1965).
186. In re van Geldern, 5 Cal. 3d 832, 489 P.2d 578, 97 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1971); In re
Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970).
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curity problems and inherent administrative difficulties.
Dissenting Justice Newman accurately noted that the majority. did not base its holding on a finding of need for reasonable
security. He also pointed out that prison officials are currently
making decision about whether a bona fide family exists in regard to other relationships.187 The dissent questioned whether
the legislature meant to authorize the Department to exclude
members of a stable, alternative family while at the same time
allowing visits by aunts, uncles and cousins of a bona fide foster
family. He disagreed with Justice Bird's conclusion that reasonable security justified the restriction, noting that allowing meretricious family visits might actually foster law-abiding behavior
after release because family ties had been nourished during
incarceration.
The majority in Cummings basically ignored Penal Code
section 2600 in upholding Administrative Code section 3174
merely because it was "reasonable" and consistent with a "legitimate state interest." By doing so, it denied a prisoner's civil
rights without tying such denial to reasonable security or public
protection as required by section 2600.
III. PROPERTY LAW

A.

HOUSING DISCRIMINATION

1. Landlord may not maintain separate financial standards for married and unmarried applicants

Hess v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, 138 Cal.
App. 3d 232, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712 (lst Dist. 1983). In Hess v. Fair
Employment and Housing Commission (FEHC), the court of
appeal held that a landlord's maintenance of separate financial
standards for married and unmarried applicant couples violated
the Fair Employment and Housing Act. It also held that the
FEHC's award of separate damages to each of the aggrieved
complainants was allowed under the Act.
187. Section 3174 lists as family members: "Aunts, Uncles, and cousins ... where a
bona fide foster relationship exists"; and "Adoptive parents, if the adoption occurred and
a family relationship existed prior to the inmate's incarceration." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
15, R. 3174 (1982). Thus the administrative procedures necessary to determine whether a
family relationship exists are already intact.
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Plaintiff landlords rejected the rental application of an unmarried couple based on landlords' policy of requiring each unmarried applicant to qualify separately. The couple was expecting a baby, and because the woman would not work after the
birth, she could not qualify on her income alone. Landlords subsequently rented to a similarly situated married couple by allowing aggregation of their income, and the rejected couple complained to the Division of Fair Employment Practices. 188 At an
administrative hearing, landlords were found to have unlawfully
discriminated against the unmarried couple on the basis of marital status in violation of Government Code section 12955(a),189
and were ordered to pay each of them $1000. Landlords' petition
for writ of administrative mandamus was denied and they
appealed.
Government Code section 12955(a), a part of the Fair Employment and Housing Act,190 makes it an unlawful practice for
a landlord to discriminate against any person on the basis of
marital status. Under former Health and Safety Code section
35720,191 the forerunner of section 12955(a), discrimination
against unmarried couples has been held to be based on "marital
.
status. "191
A similar provision in the federal Equal Credit Opportunity
Act (ECOA)198 prohibits discrimination in any aspect of a credit
transaction on the basis of marital statuS. llH In Markham v. Colonial Mort. Servo Co., Associates,l9I the court held that a creditor's refusal to aggregate the incomes of an unmarried couple to
determine their eligibility for a joint mortgage violated section
1691(a)(1) of the ECOA, where such aggregation would have
been allowed a married couple.
188. Now the Department of Fair Employment and Housing.
189. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12955(a) (Deering 1982).
190. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (Deering 1982).
191. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35720 (Deering 1975), amended by Act of Sept.
30, 1977, ch. 1187, § 5, 1977 Cal. Stat. 3885, repealed by Act of Sept. 19, 1980, ch. 992, §
8, 1980 Cal. Stat. 3138.
192. See Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Auth., 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 99, 130 Cal.
.
Rptr. 375, 381 (1976).
193. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-169lf (1976).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1976).
195. 605 F.2d 566, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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Landlords here challenged the holding of discrimination on
the grounds that: (1) different financial criteria for married and
unmarried couples without moral judgment is not discrimination
on the basis of marital status; and (2) it harms their financial
interests to require a single standard because unmarried people
are not legally responsible for each other's debts.
Analogizing to the ECOA, the court held that landlords'
policy discriminated solely on the basis of marital status. The
court also held that landlords' claim of potential financial harm
was not a legitimate business interest justifying the policy since
each tenant may be held personally liable for the entire rent.
At the time of the administrative hearing, Government
Code section 12987(2)196 authorized the FEHC to order the
"payment of actual and punitive damages to the aggrieved person in an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1000)."197
However, section 12925(d)198 defines "person" for purposes of
the Act to include "one or more individuals."
Landlords argued that these two sections combined indicated a legislative intent to limit damages to $1000 for anyone
instance of discrimination by defining the complaining couple as
one "aggrieved person." The court rejected this contention in reliance on a California Attorney. General's opinion 199 deciding the
same question as to former Health and Safety Code section
35738,200 the forerunner to section 12987. That decision held
that the Act's definition of "person" did not apply to section
35738 so as to limit its maximum aggregate award of damages,
and that the term "aggrieved person" had come to indicate individual relief on both a statewide and a nationwide basis in a variety of civil rights contexts. The court agreed that a reading
such as landlords' would "defeat the intent of the Legislature,
196. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12987(2) (Deering 1982) amended by Act of Sept. 27, 1981,
ch. 899, § 3, 1981 Cal. Stat. 505.
197. Section 12987(2) was amended between the time of the hearing and the appeal
to read, "The payment of punitive damages in an amount not to exceed one thousand
dollars ($1000) ... and the payment of actual damages."
198. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12925(d) (Deering 1982).
199. Opinion No. SO 72-35, 56 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 338 (1973).
200. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35738 (Deering 1975), repealed by Act of Sept.
19, 1980, ch. 992, § 8, 1980 Cal. Stat. 3138.
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hinder the implementation of. . . public policy. . and controvert the clear meaning of prior statutory schemes. "201
2. Landlord's discrimination against homosexuals violates
Unruh Act
Hubert v. Williams, 133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 161 (Cal. App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1982). The court in Hubert v. Williams applied Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson 201 to
hold that homosexuals are a class protected from arbitrary discrimination under the Unruh Act. Thus, a landlord may not arbitrarily evict homosexual tenants or tenants who associate with
homosexuals.
Plaintiffs-appellants were a quadriplegic man (Hubert) and
his live-in attendant (Kelly), a lesbian. They sued their former
landlord under the Unruh Civil Rights Actl03 after he evicted
them, allegedly because Kelly was a homosexual and Hubert associated with homosexuals. The trial court sustained the landlord's demurrer, holding that the complaint did not state a cause
of action under the Unruh Act. Plaintiffs appealed.
The Unruh Act reads in pertinent part: "All persons within
the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter
what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of
every kind whatsoever."I04
The history of California's public accommodations laws,lo,
which were precursors of the Unruh Act, reveals that the first
codification of those laws did not include suspect classes, but
prohibited any arbitrary discrimination in certain listed businesses and "all other places of public accommodation."2" Until
1959, the main amendments to the public accommodations laws
201. 56 Ops. Cal. Att'y. Gen. at 338.
202. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal, Rptr. 496 (1982) (families with children
protected by Unruh Act from arbitrary discrimination in rental housing).
203. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering 1983).
204. 1d.
205. As recited in In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, (1970).
206. Act of March 13, 1897, ch. 108, § 1,1897 Cal. Stat. 137; Cox, Cal. 3d at 213, 474
P.2d at 996, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
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expanded upon the types of businesses listed. The courts applied this statute to protect some classes of people not eventually listed in the Unruh Act, including homosexuals. 2 0 7 According to the California Supreme Court in In re Cox, the Unruh Act
arose out of a concern that the courts were too narrowly defining
the types of businesses covered by the statutes. Thus, the Unruh
Act explicitly covered "all business establishments of any kind
whatsoever." Based on the above history, the California Supreme Court has held in several cases that the legislature intended the Unruh Act suspect classes to be illustrative rather
than restrictive. 208
The Hubert court considered Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson
to be fully dispositive of the issues in Hubert. In Wolfson, the
California Supreme Court held that the Unruh Act prevented
landlords from refusing to rent to families solely because they
included minor children. Such refusal was held to be arbitrary
discrimination, all forms of which were prohibited not withstanding the fact that they were not among the particular forms
quoted in the Act itself. The Hubert court held that discrimination on the basis of sexual preference was also such prohibited
arbitrary discrimination and remanded for a determination of
whether the eviction was reasonable, based on Hubert's and
Kelly's actual conduct.
The court further supported its finding that homosexuals
are a class protected by the Unruh Act by citing Stoumen v.
Reilly,209 in which the State Board of Equalization was prohibited from withholding a liquor license from a bar and restaurant
merely because it served a gay clientele. Dicta in that case indicated that the proprietor would be liable in damages to homosexuals if he excluded them on the basis of their sexual preference. The Hubert court also noted that other statutes
207. Stoumen v. Reilly, 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951) (right of homosexuals to
frequent bar and restaurant recognized, so that proprietor's liquor license could not be
dependent upon his excluding them). Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 36 Cal. 2d 734,
227 P.2d 449 (1951) (race track customer may not be excluded solely for reputation as an
"immoral character").
208. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496
(1982); In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970); cf. Gay Law
Students Ass'n. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1979).
209. 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969.
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prohibiting arbitrary discrimination had been held to apply to
discrimination against homosexuals, even when they were not
listed as a protected class in such statutes.210 Finally, the court
held that since homosexuals are protected by the Unruh Act, the
right to associate with homosexuals is also protected. 211
It has long been public policy in California to prohibit all
forms of arbitrary discrimination. Discrimination against homosexuals has been successfully challenged as arbitrary in contexts
other than rental housing, and other forms of arbitrary discrimination have been prohibited in a rental housing context. Hubert
v. Williams correctly applies this policy to prohibit arbitrary
discrimination against homosexuals in a rental .housing context.
B.

RETALIATORY EVICTION

1. Eviction for reporting criminal acts of landlord is
retaliatory

Barela v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 244, 636 P.2d 582, 178
Cal. Rptr. 618 (1981). In Barela v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court extended the availabiliy of the retaliatory
eviction defense to tenants evicted in retaliation for reporting
criminal acts of their landlords. The court allowed a tenant to
raise the defense when her landlord evicted her in alleged retaliation for reporting to the police that he had sexually abused her
nine-year-old daughter.

Defendant tenant reported to the police tht her landlord
had sexually molested her daughter. Seven days later, plaintiff
landlord began procedures which eventually led to an unlawful
detainer action against defendant.lI12 The trial court found both
that the eviction was caused by defendant's complaint to the police, and that the criminal trial against plaintiff had made it im210. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 475-78, 595
P.2d 592, 602-04, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 25-26 (1979) (Cal. Public Utilities Code § 453(a)
banning arbitrary discrimination by a public utility held to prohibit arbitrary employment discrimination against homosexuals).
211. See also Winchell v. English, 62 Cal. App. 3d 125, 128-29, 133 Cal. Rptr. 20, 2122 (1976) (Unruh Act protected tenants from an eviction based solely on their sub-letting to blacks).
212. Plaintiff's "procedures" included raising defendant's rent from $200.00 to
$650.00 without notice, serving her with a legally ineffective 3 day notice to "pay rent or
quit," and later with a 30 day termination notice.
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possible for the parties to live near one another. But, it did not
recognize defendant's right to a retaliatory eviction defense
under Civil Code section 1942.5213 or under California case
law,214 and awarded plaintiff restitution of the premises and
back rent. Defendant appealed.
In general, affirmative defenses are not allowed in unlawful
detainer actions because of the need to protect the summary nature of such proceedings.2lI! However, some exceptions have
emerged, including that of retaliatory eviction. The defense has
been developed along both common law and statutory lines.
It was first allowed at common law when landlords retaliated against tenants who exercised repair and deduct rights,216
and was later expanded to include retaliation against tenants
who filed suit against their landlords under statutes that depended upon such suits for their enforcement.217 In S.P. Growers
Ass'n v. Rodriguez,218 the court promulgated a test for determining the availability of a retaliatory eviction defense: the public
policies furthered by allowing the defense must outweigh the
state's interest in summary unlawful detainer proceedings.

The defense was first codified in 1970 as Civil Code section
1942.5219 applying to retaliations against tenants who exercised
"repair and deduct" rights under section 1942. 220 In 1979, section 1942.5 was repealed and reenacted in expanded form to allow the defense when landlords retaliate against tenants for,
213. CAL. CIY. CODE § 1942.5 (Deering 1981).
214. See S.P. Growers Ass'n v. Rodriguez, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 552 P.2d 721, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 761 (1976) (retaliatory eviction is valid defense when defendant's eviction was allegedly in retaliation for filing suit against landlord under Farm Labor Contractor Regulation Act).
215. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 632-34, 517 P.2d 1168, 1178-80,
111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 714-16 (1974); Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 4 Cal. App. 3d 716, 721, 84
Cal. Rptr. 756, 760 (1970).
216. Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1970).
217. S.P. Growers, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 552 P.2d 721, 131 Cal. Rptr. 761.
218. 1d.
219. Act of Sept. 16, 1970, ch. 1280, § 5, 1970 Cal. Stat. 2314 (codified at CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1942.5) (repealed by Act of Sept. 14, 1979, ch. 652, § I, 1979 Cal. Stat. 2005) (reenacted by Act of Sept. 14, 1979, ch. 652, § 2, 1979 Cal. Stat. 2005) (codified at CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1942.5 (Deering 1980».
220. CAL. CIY. CODE § 1942 (Deering 1981).
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among other things, "lawfully and peacefully exercis[ing) any
rights under the law."
The supreme court held here that it was improper under
both common law and statutory analyses not to allow the defense. It also held defendant to be successful in defending
against the unlawful detainer action under both analyses.
Under a common law analysis, the court held that the public policies of protecting children from abuse, and of ensuring
that criminal laws are enforced, and that victims and police informants are protected from retaliation outweigh the need for
summary proceedings. In any event, the court concluded, any
delay would not be of the complex and protracted nature feared
in other types of cases. 221
The court noted that as a remedial statute, section 1942.5
must be construed liberally to effect its objectives. Since California has long protected the rights of its citizens to report
crimes,222 the court held that such right is within the meaning of
the "[lawful) and [peaceful) exercise [of] any rights under the
law" found in section 1942.5.
The supreme court upheld a tenant's right to claim a retaliatory eviction defense when she was evicted for reporting her
landlord's criminal acts to the police. In so doing, it correctly
reasoned that, "[t)o hold otherwise would be to create a special
class of criminals - those who also happen to be landlords - with
a legally sanctioned means of punishing the victims or witnesses
of their crime [sic)."22a
IV. TORT LAW
A.

CIVIL DAMAGES FOR RAPE

1.

Civil damages to husband and wife for rape of wife

Delia S. v. Torres, 134 Cal. App. 3d 471, 184 Cal. Rptr. 787
221. See Union Oil Co., 4 Cal. App. 3d 716, 84 Cal. Rptr. 756 (retaliatory eviction
defense not allowed where service station lessee was evicted in alleged retaliation for
refusing to accede to plaintiff lessor's scheme to breach anti-trust laws).
222. See Ball v. Rawles, 93 Cal. 222, 228, 28 P. 937, 938 (1892); CAL. PEN. CODE §
136.1(b)(l) (Deering 1983).
223. Barela, 30 Cal. 3d at 244, 636 P.2d at 582, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
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(2d Dist. 1982). In Delia S. v. Torres, the court of appeal upheld
a jury verdict awarding a husband and wife damages for rape of
the wife by a friend of the family. The court rejected defendant's challenges of the admission of expert testimony concerning the reactions of rape victims and the motives and characteristics of rapists, and the exclusion of evidence of the victim's
sexual conduct. It also held that allowing the victim to recover
separate damages for both battery and the intentional infliction
of emotional distress, was not an impermissible double recovery.
In addition, the court allowed an award of damages to the victim's husband for the intentional infliction of emotional distress,
although he was not present when his wife was raped.
Plaintiffs, a married couple, were close friends of defendant
and his wife. Both couples were active in the same cultural-social group, and saw each other socially on many occasions. After
leaving plaintiff husband at the airport on one occasion, defendant raped plaintiff wife at knife point in the back seat of his
car. She kept the rape a secret from her husband for approximately a month and a half because she was ashamed, humiliated, and frightened. During that time, defendant advised plaintiff husband that plaintiff wife "needed psychiatric care." After
his wife told him of the rape, husband confronted defendant,
who admitted to the incident and promised to pay for plaintiff
wife to have an abortion. When defendant subsequently refused
to pay for the abortion, approximately two months after the
rape occurred, plaintiffs reported the rape to the police.
At trial, defendant testified tht plaintiff wife had consented
to have intercourse with him and that they had in fact been having an affair. He claimed that he had not admitted to raping
plaintiff wife, but that he had agreed to pay for the abortion
because of their affair. He also introduced evidence of his status
as a close friend, a professional person, and a community leader.
The court entered judgment on a jury verdict that defendant
had committed a battery against plaintiff wife in the form of a
rape, had intentionally inflicted emotional distress on both
plaintiffs, and that plaintiff husband had suffered a loss of consortium as a result of the rape.
Defendant's assertions on appeal included: (1) that the admission of expert testimony concerning the reactions of rape vicWomen's Law Forum
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tims and the motives and character of rapists was prejudicial error under section 352 of the Evidence Code 224 ; (2) that plaintiff
wife's recovery for both battery and the intentional infliction of
emotional distress was an impermissible "double recovery"; and
(3) that plaintiff husband's recovery for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress was improper as a recovery for a "wrong
committed on another. "2211
Evidence Code section 801(a)228 limits expert testimony to
subjects that are beyond common experience. Section 352 gives
the trial court discretion to exclude evidence when its probative
value is outweighed by its potential for prejudice, confusion or
misleading of jurors.
In People v. Clark,227 admission of an expert police witness'
testimony was found to be prejudicial error under section 352 in
a criminal trial for forcible rape. 228 The Delia S. court rejected
defendant's contention that it was prejudicial error to admit the
expert testimony here. It reasoned, per section 801(a), .that although we all hold opinions as to the reactions of rape victims
and the motives and character of rapist, they may be grossly erroneous. It held that such subjects are "not within the common
knowledge of jurors."
Also, while the evidence was found to be irrelevant in Clark,
it was held to be highly relevant here because the "penultimate
issue ... was one of witness credibility."229 The court therefore
224. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (Deering 1966).
225. Defendant also challenged several jury instructions which the court upheld
summarily because they correctly stated the law, and because defendant had not requested clarifying instructions at trial. Such challenges were, therefore, held to be waived
on appeal.
226. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(a) (Deering 1966).
227. 109 Cal. App. 3d 88, 167 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1980).
228. The expert testified in response to a hypothetical based on the facts of the
case, that the amount of resistance shown by the victim was reasonable under all the
circumstances. The Clark court cited People v. Guthreau, 102 Cal. App. 3d 436, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 376 (1980), in which the admissioll of similar evidence was also found to be in
error. In Guthreau, the court held that the proper inquiry was not whether the victim's
resistance was reasonable, but whether her acts of resistance made reasonably manifest
her refusal to consent. The goal of the inquiry was to determine whether defendant had
a bona fide reasonable belief that the victim consented.
229. Where in Clark and Guthreau the issue was whether, under all the circum- .
stances, the defendant's alleged belief in the victim's consent was reasonable, the question here was precisely what "all the circumstances" were, or which party's version of the
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held that the expert testimony was relevant as a backdrop
against which to view the parties' testimonies.
Specifically, the court held that the evidence on the reactions of rape victims was relevant in light of defendant's theory
that plaintiff wife's conduct was inconsistent with that of a rape
victim. Such testimony was not held to be prejudicial since it
simply reported general information on common reactions of
rape victims. The evidence on the motives and character of rapists carried more prejudicial potential, but the court held that its
probative value far outweighed such potential. It found defendant's emphasis on his status as a friend, a professional person,
and a community leader, presumably to suggest that he was not
the "type" to commit a rape, significant. Thus, evidence tending
to dispel common myths about the "types" who rape, was of
great probative value. Again, its prejudicial potential was mitigated by the fact that it was generally, rather than specifically,
oriented toward defendant's conduct or personality.
In People v. Guthreau,230 the court excluded evidence of the
victim's past sexual conduct with men other than the defendant
as irrelevant to the issue of consent under Evidence Code section l103(b)(1).1l81 The Delia S. court held that the consent issue
is the same in a civil context as in a criminal context, and therefore upheld the exclusion of evidence of plaintiff wife's past sexual conduct with men other than the defendant.
Defendant's "double recovery" challenge grew out of the
fact that damages for both the intentional infliction of emotional
distress and battery include "any pain, discomfort, fears, anxiety
and other distress." The court held it was not an impermissible
double recovery for the jury to award plaintiff wife separate
damages for the emotional distress caused by defendant's abuse
and manipUlation of their friendship and his position of trust
and influence. It also held that his subsequent acts, including
telling plaintiff husband that his wife needed psychiatric care,
circumstances was to be believed.
230. 102 Cal. App. 3d at 444, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 380. See a/so People v. Blackburn, 56
Cal. App. 3d 685, 690, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864, 866 (1976).
231. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1l03(b)(1) (Deering 1983) (opinion evidence, reputation evidence and evidence of past sexual conduct with men other than defendant not admissible to prove consent in a criminal rape trial).
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would support an independent recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 232
The court also rejected defendant's contention that the trial
court had allowed plaintiff husband to recover for a wrong "committed on another." An action for an unauthorized autopsy on
the body of a spouse has been held to be a personal action arising from the plaintiff's relationship with the deceased and the
effect of the autopsy on the plaintiff personally.233 The court
held that the same was true of plaintiff's husband's action for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of the
rape of his wife.
The most striking aspect of the decision in Delia S. v.
Torres, is the court's admission of evidence as to the reactions of
.rape victims and the motives and character of rapists. Although
such evidence has as yet been excluded from criminal rape trials,
the court recognized that "[i]t was vital that the jury have as
realistic a view as possible of the manner in which rape victims
react to the experience and the motives for rape, to the end that
the jury not decide the credibility issue on the basis of extraneous factors or personal misconceptions."234 These observations
would seem to be equally applicable to criminal rape trials,
where the consent defense is likely to be based on many of the
same elements that were asserted here. It remains to be seen
whether this case might be followed by similar analyses in the
criminal sphere.
B.

MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIPS

1. Wrongful death suit for death of meretricious spouse
not allowed

Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 133 Cal. App. 3d 890, 184
Cal. Rptr. 390 (2d Dist. 1982); Nieto v. City of Los Angeles, 138
Cal. App. 3d 464, 188 Cal. Rptr. 31 (2d Dist. 1983). Two courts
of appeal have held that a woman cannot sue under Code of
Civil Procedure section 377 fur the wrongful death of her mere232. The court made this analysis although it had already held that defendant had
waived his right to challenge the allegedlY faulty jury instructions.
233. Huntly v. Zurich Gen. Accident and Liab. Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 201, 280 P.
163 (1929). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868, comment a (1979).
234. Delia S., 134 Cal. App. 3d at 485, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 796.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983

61

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 8

792

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:731

tricious spouse. In Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co. and Nieto v.
City of Los Angeles, the courts followed prior California decisions refusing to expand the wrongful death statute absent an
unconstitutional limitation. Both courts held that under rational
basis scrutiny, no such unconstitutional limitation existed as to
meretricious spouses.
In Garcia, the deceased and plaintiff were engaged to be
married. The wedding was scheduled to occur eight days after
his death in an air crash. They had lived together, bought a
house together, and shared resources and expenses. Plaintiff
sued for deceased's alleged wrongful death and the trial court
granted summary judgment against her. Plaintiff appealed. In
Nieto, deceased and plaintiff were engaged to be married and
had a child. Four days before their wedding, deceased was
wrongfully and recklessly shot and killed by a Los Angeles police
officer. Plaintiff sued for wrongful death and the trial court sustained defendant City's demurrer. Plaintiff appealed.
Code of Civil Procedure section 377,2311 California's wrongful
death statute, allows a cause of action by a decedent's "heirs" or
"personal representatives" against a person or persons wrongfully causing such decedent's death. Section 377(b)236 defines
heirs as 1) persons entitled to succeed to decedents' property
under Probate Code section 200-258;a37 2) decedents' putative
spouses and their children, decedents' stepchildren and parents,
when they are dependents of decedent; and 3) other dependent
minors living with decedent. Meretricious spouses are not listed
in section 200-258 as persons entitled to succeed to decedents'
property.
The California Supreme Court has held that the right to
privacy under the California Constitution includes the right to
live with whomever one wishes. In City of Santa Barbara v.
Adamson,1l38 the Court used strict scrutiny to strike down a zoning ordinance which limited the number of unrelated adults who
could live together.
235.
236.
237.
238.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODS § 377 (Deering 1983).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377(b) (Deering 1983).
CAL. PROS. CODE §§ 200-258. (Deering 1974 & Supp. 1983).
27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptl. 539 (1980).
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In Garcia, plaintiff argued that she was an "heir" for purposes of section 377 and alternatively, that the court should expand section 377's definition of "heir" to include her. Although
plaintiff in Nieto conceded she was not among section 377's
"heirs," both plaintiffs claimed that their exclusion from section
377's definition of "heirs" violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the California Constitution by violating a
fundamental right. Plaintiff in Nieto articulated that fundamental right as the right to privacy, including the right to associate
freely. She argued that the statute should be strictly scrutinized
as required by Adamson.
These same arguments were addressed approximately one
year before Garcia, in Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines,
Inc. 239 In a factual setting almost identical to Garcia, the Harrod
court held that because a cause of action for wrongful death is
entirely statutory in origin, the legislature may determine,
within constitutional limits, who may sue under it. The test for
constitutionality was whether limitations on who may sue were
"rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of placing reasonable limits on the right to recover for wrongful death."240 Excluding meretricious spouses was held to be "reasonably related"
because such relationships lack permanence, present greater
problems of proof, and involve increased danger of fraudulent
claims. Such exclusion was also held to be reasonably related to
the legitimate state interest of promoting marriage.
The court in Nieto agreed that rational basis scrutiny was
the appropriate standard. It distinguished the ordinance in
Adamson from section 377 because such ordinance imposed a
limitation on unrelated people's ability to live together, whereas
section 377 conferred a right on certain classes of people. The
court could see no connection between a person's right to sue for
wrongful death and her/his choice of living companion. Under
rational basis scrutiny, the court went on to hold that meretricious spouses are not similarly situated to married people or
other dependent classifications listed in section 377(b). Concluding that "the hallmark of the statute generally is not, as plaintiff
239.
240.
in Steed
329, 334

118 Cal. App. 3d 155, 173 Cal. Rptr. 68 (4th Dist. 1981).
Id. at 158, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 71. Strict scrutiny of section 377 was also rejected
v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 123-24, 524 P.2d 801, 806, 115 Cal. Rptr.
(1974).
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argues, dependency; rather, it is the enforcement of obligations,"
the court nevertheless went on to distinguish the "contractualobligation category" of stepchildren from meretricious spouses
because, "[c]hildren are a particularly vulnerable class in their
dependency. "
The court in Garcia also rejected plaintiff's contention that
the definition of "heir" in section 377 should be judicially expanded because it is unconstitutional. Its reasoning was substantially the same as that in Harrod. Quoting Harrod, it characterized meretricious relationships as impermanent because the
parties had chosen not to formalize them and held that
problems of proof and fruadulent claims were more likely in actions by meretricious spouses. Yet in both Harrod and Garcia,
as well as in Nieto, the couples had chosen to formalize their
relationships and had been robbed of the opportunity to carry
out their plans. Determining future losses is no more difficult
the day before the wedding than the day after. And it is difficult
to see how denying the claims of people about to be married will
encourage others to marry. There would be, however, difficult
factual inquiries involved in determining which meretricious relationships had attained the requisite permanence, whereas such
permanence is assumed (though perhaps not justifiably so) in
marital relationships.
In Garcia, plaintiff also argued that according to Estate of
Atherleyl41 she was an "heir" to her meretricious spouse's property under the Family Law Act. The court, however, held that
Marvin v. Marvin 242 had overruled that aspect of Atherley and
relied on the fact that the legislature had not thereafter expanded either the Probate Code or section 377's definition of
"heir" to include meretricious spouses. Both the Garcia and
Nieto courts held that, because the legislature had undertaken
to expand section 377's definition to include dependent stepchildren 248 in response to a court's denying their recovery,244 the leg241. 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975) (held that under the Family Law
Act, a meretricious spouse has the same property rights to heirship as a putative spouse,
when an actual family relationship is shown).
242. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 665, 557 P.2d 106, 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 819 (1976).
243. Act of Aug. 25, 1975, ch. 334, § 1, 1975 Cal. Stat. 784 (codified at CAL. CIY.
PROC. CODE § 377(b)(2) (Deering 1983».
244. Steed, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 524 P.2d 801, 115 Cal. Rptr. 329.
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islature had intended to exclude meretricious spouses from
recovery.2411
Until the legislature is persuaded to expand the definition
of "heir" for purposes of section 377 to include meretricious
spouses, the courts will be unlikely to do so because they find a
rational relation between the current definition and a legitimate
state interest. And until such definition is expanded to include
them, meretricious spouses will continue to be denied a wrongful
death cause of action, regardless of the status of their non-marital relationship.
2. Meretricious spouse with "stable and significant" relationship may sue for loss of consortium
Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal.
. Rptr. 503 (4th Dist. 1983). In Butcher v. Superior Court, a California court of appeal held for the first time that a meretricious
spouse who could prove a "stable and significant" relationship
with her injured spouse could claim loss of consortium resulting
from her spouse's injury. It reasoned that such an unmarried
person's interest in the continuation of the relationship is no
longer outweighed by policy considerations which favor limiting
the consortium action to married people. The court distinguished the marriage requirement in a consortium action from
that in an action for statutory wrongful death246 because of the
common law nature of the loss of consortium cause of action.

Plaintiffs, a meretricious couple, had lived together for more
than eleven years, had two children, filed joint tax returns, used
the same name and considered themselves married. When plaintiff husband was allegedly struck by defendant's car, he sued for
personal injuries and his meretricious wife sued for loss of consortium. Defendant moved for summary judgment against wife
based on the lack of a legally valid marriage and the trial court
denied his motion. Defendant appealed.
The loss of consortium cause of action originated as a hus245. It should be noted, however, that the analogy is somewhat faulty because
neither Atherley nor Marvin were section 377 cases, and because until 1981, the court
had not yet ruled on the wrongful death claim of a meretricious spouse.
246. See supra, Survey note on Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 133 Cal. App. 3d 890,
184 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1982), at 791.
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band's claim for loss of his proprietary interest in his wife's services.247 The modern theory recognizes loss of consortium as a
cause of action for loss of a relational interest,248 and in California it has been extended to wives as well as to husbands. 24e In all
but one case,2110 however, courts have assumed that the claim is
available only to people who are legally married at the time of
the injury.2II1 For instance in Donough v. Vile,2II2 the court held
that a husband could not recover for loss of consortium resulting
from injuries to his wife occurring before their marriage.
So far, California's loss of consortium cause of action has
similarily been limited to legally married people. In Borer v.
American Airlines2lls the California Supreme Court denied the
child of an injured parent a loss of consortium claim. Emphasizing the differences between parental and sexual consortium, the
court expressed concern that allowing a child's action might
"open the floodgates" to all members of the family.2114 The court
held that the loss of consortium action must be narrowly circumscribed for policy reasons. In Tong v. Jocson,21111 a couple who
were engaged and had lived together for three months when the
injury occurred were denied a cause of action for loss of consortium in a very short opinion which relied heavily on Borer. And
in Etienne v. DKM Enterprises, Inc. 2l1s a meretricious couple
who had lived together for eight years sued for injuries and loss
of consortium based on an alleged Texas common law marriage.
The court denied their claim based on the invalidity of the marriage under Texas law. m
247. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 873, § 124 (4th ed. 1971).
248. Id.
249. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 765 (1974). Other jurisdictions have also extended the cause of action to wives. See
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359
Mich. 33, 101 N.W. 2d 227 (1960).
250. Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980).
25l. Id. at 1079.
252. 61 Pa.D C 460 (1947).
253. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
254. The court also pointed out that a spousal cause of action involves only one
additional claim, whereas allowing a cause of action to children could greatly increase the
number of potential claims flowing from a single negligent act.
255. 76 Cal. App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977).
256. 136 Cal. App. 3d 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1982).
257. Since both parties assumed that legal marriage was an element of the 1088 of
consortium cause, the court ruled only on the validity of the "common law" marriage.
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The Butcher court nevertheless held that a legal marriage
was not a prerequisite to plaintiff wife's claim for loss of consortium. The court reasoned that Donough and similar cases merely
recognized that a loss of consortium action sought to protect a
relational interest, and that injuries occurring before such an interest existed were not compensable. Recognizing that unmarried people also have an interest in the continuation of certain
relationships, the court analyzed several policy considerations
which might, nevertheless, justify limiting the action to those
who are legally married. These considerations included: 1) lack
of precedent; 2) the indirect nature of the injury; 3) the speculative nature of damages; 4) a danger of opening the "floodgates"
to other plaintiffs; and 5) the public policy favoring marriage.
The court ultimately found that none of these considerations
justified the limitation.
On California precedent, the court first emphasized the "inherent capacity of the common law for growth and change"2118
and the responsibility of the courts for its upkeep.2119 It then attacked the precedential value of each of the above cases. Because Borer was based upon the difference between parental and
sexual consortium, the court held that it was not applicable to
plaintiffs relationship which more resembled a marital than a
parent-child relationship. The Tong relationship, the court held
was not well enough established at the time of the accident to
support a loss of consortium claim. Additionally, the Tong
court's reliance on Borer was misplaced according to Butcher
because of the difference in the types of relationships involved.
And because the parties in Etienne agreed that marriage was a
prerequisite, and the court focused only on the question whether
a valid marriage existed, the Butcher court refused to recognize
it as precedent in this case.
Instead, the court relied upon a case in which New Jersey
law was applied, to allow a loss of consortium cause of action to
a meretricious spouse. That case, Bullock v. United States,260 is
the only case in which the marriage issue has been directly addressed, since in all other cases it was assumed that marriage

AM.

258. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 384, 525 P.2d at 671, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 767 quoting 15
JUR. 2n, Common Law §§ 1-2, at 794-96 (2d ed. 1957).
259. Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d at 393, 525 P.2d at 680, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
260. 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980).
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was a prerequisite. The Bullock court cited a host of recent authority from all over the country, questioning common law views
of unmarried couples in other contexts, and pointed out the similarities between meretricious and marital relationships. The
Butcher court accepted its analysis.
As mentioned earlier, the court also rejected policy considerations which might nevertheless justify limiting loss of consortium to married people. Most of them had already been rejected
for the purpose of extending the action to wives, and the court
held that the same analyses applied here. As to the indirect nature of the injury, the court held that the ultimate issue is foreseeability of the injury to the meretricious spouse. In this contemporary society, it held, the existence of a meretricious
relationship and injury to that relationship is entirely foreseeable. Therefore damages are not indirect. It also reasoned that
the damages were no more speculative than any other emotional
or mental damages, including those in a wife's loss of consortium
action. Again emphasizing the difference in kind between established sexual relationships and other familial relationships, the
court held that the "floodgates" potential was not sufficient to
justify disallowing the action. Finally, the court rejected the argument that wrongful death and Workers Compensation statutes indicated a public policy in favor of marriage. The statutory
nature of these causes of action, it reasoned, entirely distinguished them from a common law loss of consortium action.
By way of limitation, the court held that only where plaintiffs could prove a stable and significant relationship would the
cause of action be available. Factors involved in proving such a
relationship might include: 1) the duration of the relationships;
2) a mutual contract; 3) the extent of economic cooperation and
entanglement; 4) the exclusivity of the sexual relationship; and,
5) the existence of a "family" relationship with children. The
court affirmed the denial of defendant's summary judgment and
remanded to allow plaintiffs to prove such a relationship.
The court in Butcher broke new ground by allowing a meretricious spouse to bring a loss of consortium action. In so doing,
it recognized an important interest in the continuation of "stable and significant" non-marital relationships. Although the
court discredited California's rather weak precedent disallowing
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such actions, certainly no precedent compels its conclusion, and
its fate, should it be appealed, is uncertain.

C. WRONGFUL LIFE ACTIONS
1. Child born impaired may not bring action for wrongful
life general damages

Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337 (1982). In Turpin v. Sortini, the California Supreme
Court resolved the question of whether or not a child has a cause
of action for wrongful life. It held that a child plaintiff may not
bring a wrongful life action to recover general damages for being
born impaired, rather than not being born at all, but may recover special damages for extraordinary expenses.

Plaintiff parents were advised by a speech and hearing specialist that their daughter had normal hearing when, in fact, she
was completely deaf due to a hereditary ailment. Relying on this
diagnosis, parents conceived their second child who was also
born completely deaf. Alleging that the second child would not
have been conceived had they known of the genetic deafness,
parents brought a negligence suit on behalf of their second child.
They sought both damages for the child's being deprived of the
fundamental right to be born as a whole, functional human being without total deafness, and special damages for extraordinary expenses for specialized teaching, training, and hearing
equipment. The trial court dismissed the entire cause of action
on demurrer and the court of appeal affirmed. Plaintiffs
appealed.
The question of whether or not a child can bring a wrongful
life action was addressed and decided differently in two California courts of appeal. In Cur lender v. Bio-Science Laboratories,261 the court held that an infant born with Tay-Sachs disease stated a cause of action for wrongful life against the
defendant laboratories which had negligently misinformed the
child's parents that they would not produce a child afflicted with
the disease. The court of appeal in Turpin, however, had denied
plaintiff a cause of action for either general or special damages.
Previously, although courts of appeal had upheld parents' rights
261. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
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to sue for the birth of unexpected and unwanted children due to
another's negligence,262 they had denied a healthy unwanted
child's right to sue for being born as opposed to. not being
born.26s
Courts outside of California had generally allowed some recovery to the parents of hereditarily afflicted children who were
born because of the negligence of medical professionals. 264 However, they had uniformly rejected general damages claims by
such children themselves. 26&
Although the supreme court in Turpin reversed, and upheld
the parents' right to recover their extraordinary expenses, it held
that a child cannot maintain a wrongful life action to recover
general damages for being born impaired rather than not being
born at all. The court framed the child's position as one of being
forced into the worse of two alternatives: existence in an impaired state as opposed to non-existence. It refused to grant recovery on this theory for two reasons. First, the court held that
it is impossible to determine rationally whether plaintiff had in
fact suffered more injury by being born than she would have by
not being born. Second, it held that it is impossible to assess
general damages in a fair, non speCUlative manner.
The court found that what the child lost is not life without
pain, but rather the unknowable status of never having been
born. Therefore, a jury would have to compare impaired life to
non-life in assessing damages, and such a comparison would be
impossible. Because of this immeasurable variable, the court
concluded that the jury could not rationally determine a specific
monetary award for general damages.
In denying recovery of general damages, the court also re262. Custodio v. Bower, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Stills v.
Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976).
263. Stills, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652.
264. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); Schroeder v.
Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E. 2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
265. See, e.g., Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. 1979), aff'd in part and reu'd in
part, 439 A.2d 110, 112 (Pa. 1981); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 11-13 (N.J. 1979); Becker, 386 N.E. 2d at 811-12; Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 374-76 (Wis. 1975).
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lied on the benefit doctrine in tort damages. 266 The two elements
involved here, according to the court, were the injury to the
child's general physical, emotional, and psychological state, and
the incidental benefit of the child's mere existence and capacity
to experience the joys of life. The court concluded that application of this doctrine is impossible because of the incalculable nature of the benefits and harms involved.
The Court further conCluded that a monetary award could
not meaningfully compensate the child for the loss of the opportunity not to be born. 267 Again, the rationale was that the monetary values of life and nonexistence could not be accurately
calculated.
A dissent of two justices argued that the court should adhere to the principles that for every wrong there is a remedy and
that an injured party should be compensated for all damages
proximately caused by the negligent party. Quoting Curlender,
it concluded that reasonable compensation can be calculated by
the " 'impartial conscience and judgment of jurors who may be
expected to act reasonably, intelligently and in harmony with
the evidence.' "26i!
In Turpin the Supreme Court allowed a wrong to go unremedied by denying a wrongful life action to a child born impaired due to a doctor's negligence. That a wrong exists here is
clear. The child's existence and suffering are genuinely detrimental and she should be able to recover damages for the pain
and suffering endured during her lifetime. A valuation of life itself is not necessary to compensate the child for the pain and
suffering inherent in having to proce,ed in life with genetic de266. Damages caused by defendant's negligence must be offset by benefits incidentially conferred on plaintiff.
267. Several cases have denied recovery because monetary damages could not meaningfully compensate the injured party. Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563
P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977); Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d
871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977) (meaningful monetary compensation impossible in cases of
loss of parental consortium).
.
268. Curlender, lOS Cal. App. 3d 811, 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 490, quoting
Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 893, 500 P.2d 880, 883, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 856, 859 (1972).
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fects made manifest by medical malpractice.
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